explaining that by statute in California, two judges must be used in capital cases involving indigent defendants, “ ‘a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital case in question’ ” must decide the reasonableness of all applications for funding for experts requested by the criminal defendant’s counsel (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 987.9)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that by statute in California, two judges must be used in capital cases involving indigent defendants, “ ‘a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital case in question’ ” must decide the reasonableness of all applications for funding for experts requested by the criminal defendant’s counsel (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 987.9)
- explaining that by statute in California, two judges must be used in capital cases involving indigent defendants, "a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital case in question" must decide the reasonableness of all applications for funding for experts requested by the criminal defendant's counsel (citations omitted)
- overruling Carlos and holding that intent to kill is not required if the defendant is the actual killer
- holding that proving intent to kill is not required when the defendant is the actual killer, but it is required when the defendant is an accomplice
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
We recently held in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1148 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], that Carlos must be overruled in light of intervening decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
2 citing opinionsSuperseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Mil
43 Cal.3d 1104, 1142 , superseded by statute as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400
Superseded on other grounds by People v. Mil, 53 Cal. 4th 400 (2012)
43 Cal.3d 1104, 1146 , superseded on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400
The opinion
KAUFMAN, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the reversal of the judgment of death under compulsion of People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 158-159 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ] and People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 928 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 572 , 705 P.2d 1248 ].
I concur fully in the majority opinion insofar as it discusses and overrules Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 79 , 672 P.2d 862 ] and in all other respects except for its purported holding there was Aranda-Bruton error here. (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ].) In my view the entire discussion as to whether there was in fact Aranda-Bruton error is both legally incorrect and unnecessary to the decision, since the majority concludes that any such error was in any event harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Aranda-Bruton error actually occurred here.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 12, 1987.