holding that hypothetically correct charge would have included deadly force allegation under Malik, where indictment alleged deadly force theory of abduction but jury charge omitted such allegation and failed to specify theory of abduction
How later courts described this case
- holding that hypothetically correct charge would have included deadly force allegation under Malik, where indictment alleged deadly force theory of abduction but jury charge omitted such allegation and failed to specify theory of abduction
- holding that when an indictment tracks the elements of an offense, it is generally sufficient to provide notice
- explaining that "extra language is 'descriptive' of an element of the offense if it 'define[s] the offense more narrowly, place[s] it in a specific setting, or describe[s] the method by which it was committed.'"
- holding defendant, charged with aggravated kidnapping is entitled to notice of method of abduction State seeks to prove, and that indictment would not authorize conviction on less than proof of alleged method
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Gollihar v. State, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (2001)
30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243
The opinion
JOHNSON, J.,
dissenting in which MEYERS, J., joined.
I agree with the majority that once the state alleged aggravated kidnapping “by using and threatening to use deadly force namely, a firearm,” it was required to prove that allegation. I also agree that the sufficiency of the evidence must be analyzed using this allegation. However, I respectfully dissent from the final disposition
In the instant case, the court of appeals concluded that the hypothetically-correct jury charge did not include the phrase “by using and threatening to use deadly force namely, a firearm, on the Complainant.” Curry v. State, 1 S.W.3d 175, 180-81 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999). The majority finds that this was error, and that the hypothetically-correct jury charge would include this phrase. Ante, at 404 - 405. Thus, the court of appeals is found to have applied the wrong standard in its sufficiency analysis. The majority then performs its own sufficiency analysis using the proper hypothetically-correct jury charge. Ante, at 406-407.
Such action is inconsistent with our precedents See, e.g., Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (judgment of court of appeals vacated and cause remanded for that court to apply correct standard of review in analyzing sufficiency of the evidence); Curry v. State, 975 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (judgment of court of appeals vacated and cause remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s sufficiency claim in light of Malik ); Blanco v. State, 962 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (judgment of court of appeals vacated and cause remanded for reconsideration in light of Malik). As we have previously stated, our jurisdiction is limited to review of decisions by the courts of appeals. Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533 , 536-37 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. 4.04, § 2; Tex.R.App. P. 66.1. Because the court of appeals did not apply the appropriate sufficiency analysis, the majority’s application of the appropriate standard is not a review of the court of appeals’ decision; it is an application of that standard in the first instance. We should remand this cause and allow the court of appeals to conduct the appropriate sufficiency analysis. To do otherwise is beyond our authority.