The opinion
REEVES, District Judge.
This case was removed from a state court. Although both parties concede the jurisdiction of the federal court, nevertheless such jurisdiction should be questioned. The suit is for damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The aggregate amount sued for is $2,192.06. Section 16, subsection (b), of the act, being Section 216(b), Title 29 U.S.C.A., provides that: “(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this chapter shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. * * * The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”
The plaintiff in this case claims $846.03 for overtime and an equal amount as liquidated damages and $500 attorney’s fee.
Said Section 16, subsection (b), of the act specifically covers the subject of juris *863 diction as follows: “Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated.”
By this enactment jurisdiction was specifically conferred upon the state as well as the federal courts. Whether it was the purpose of the Congress to confer original jurisdiction upon the federal courts without regard to the amount in controversy need not be decided. It is sufficient to say that the state court from which the action was removed was given original jurisdiction by the act.
Similarly many years ago in providing liability for injuries to the employees of railroads the Congress conferred jurisdiction upon the courts of the several states to determine questions arising under the act. It was there, however, specifically provided that “no case arising under this chapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.” Section 56, Chapter 2, Title 45 U.S.C.A.
The prohibition against removal under the Railway Employers Liability Act undoubtedly was aimed at those cases where there was a diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy was more than $3,000. Moreover, that act was just as effectively under Section 41, paragraph 8, Title 28 U.S.C.A., as the present action.
2. The question of a requisite amount to give jurisdiction in a similar proceeding was before Judge Taylor of the Eastern District of Tennessee. He construed said subsection (8) of Section 41, Title 28 U.S. C. A., in Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, D. C., 32 F.Supp. 19 . He used the following language which was justified from the authorities (32 F.Supp. loc. cit. 20): “It must be noted that Subsection (8) confers jurisdiction in cases arising under laws regulating commerce, and I think the cause of action must be shown to bear some reasonable relation to the regulatory provisions relied upon before jurisdiction would follow under this section.”
Being of the opinion that, (a) the state court had jurisdiction and that the case was not subject to removal, and (b) that the federal court’ had no jurisdiction, the case should be remanded to the state court from which it was removed. It is so ordered.