applying privity to "judgments or decrees of court," for which "privity means 'one whose interest has been legally represented at the time/" and holding that privity did not exist where the plaintiffs claimed an "independent and separate partnership interest" in the property involved, which "arose before the commencement of the first action, not subsequent thereto" (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- applying privity to "judgments or decrees of court," for which "privity means 'one whose interest has been legally represented at the time/" and holding that privity did not exist where the plaintiffs claimed an "independent and separate partnership interest" in the property involved, which "arose before the commencement of the first action, not subsequent thereto" (citation omitted)
- failure to exercise the right to intervene in a prior action does not bind a party to the judgment reached in that action
- " 'The right to intervene in an action does not, in the absence of its exercise, subject one possessing it to the risk of being bound by the result of the litigation, under the doctrine of res judicatal.P "
- right to intervene does not bind a party in a subsequent suit simply because he did not intervene when he had the chance
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*693 CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
I am unable to agree with the main opinion that the trial court erred when it held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiffs. It is my judgment that that ruling was in conformity with principles of equity and justice.
It is to be conceded that the judgment in the divorce action would not normally bar the plaintiffs’ action here because they were not parties thereto. 1 However, upon a survey of the total circumstances I think the trial court was justified in its ruling. The main opinion correctly indicates that that doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when it is shown that: (1) the prior judgment is on the same issue and the same facts; (2) the issue thus litigated was essential to support the prior judgment; and (3) that it was between parties who were the same, or in privity with them.
As to (1) there can be no question but that this “Slaugh House,” which is the subject of this suit, was one of the assets about which there was dispute in the divorce proceeding. Therein counsel for the plaintiffs’ father, Woodey B. Searle, asserted that the Slaugh House property was owned one half by the parties and the other half by the parties’ sons as a result of a claimed partnership between the father and the sons (these plaintiffs). He also urged that the father should be awarded that property.
Neither is there any question as to (2) above because it is obvious that determination as to the ownership of the house was a predicate to awarding it to the mother (plaintiff therein Edlean Searle).
The more critical question is to whether these plaintiffs, the sons of the parties to the divorce action, were sufficiently involved and interested therein that they should properly be regarded as parties in privity thereto.
It appears that this matter was submitted to the trial court on the basis of the testimony given in the divorce action. The court’s order recited that “the transcript of testimony of the previous divorce action between the plaintiff’s parents was referred to” and that “after full consideration . the court further finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is a bar to plaintiff’s claim.” It is incontestably plain that the members of the family, including the plaintiffs herein, were actively involved in that suit, which in turn involved whatever interest any of them had in the family assets. Further, they were fully aware of the adverse claims being asserted to the Slaugh House which is the subject of this suit. Two of the sons, Randy and Rhett were called to testify on behalf of their father in that trial.
It is not contended that there was ever any written partnership agreement. In his testimony plaintiff Rhett Searle characterized it as an informal arrangement. The father stated that this Slaugh House had been purchased with funds of such a partnership and that its being recorded in his name only was but an oversight. He also stated that he kept the rents collected therefrom in an account which he could spend on his own as he desired, but with the intention of putting it back.
This is a situation where the plaintiffs are seeking the aid of equity to assert ownership in property which stood of record only in their father’s name. Even under the facts as contended by them, he was the managing partner of the claimed partnership, who had control of the property in dispute and the income therefrom; and he thus should be regarded as representing and protecting whatever interests they and the claimed partnership had therein. 2 Further, plaintiffs themselves were fully aware of the disputation concerning the ownership of this property. They actively participated in that lawsuit, but asserted no claim for themselves. Instead of doing so, they stood by until the determination was made ad *694 verse to their father’s (and their own) interests. Such claim as they have in contesting the record title to the property is based solely upon supposed oral declarations made within the family, and self-serving declarations at that.
The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to protect a party from being subjected to harassment by being compelled to litigate the same controversy more than once. 3 This case impresses me as being a very good example of a situation where the trial court was justified in applying that doctrine and, consistent therewith, concluding that in equity and good conscience the plaintiffs should now be estopped from seeking the relief they asked against their mother.
For the reasons stated above I would affirm the dismissal of the case.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.
. Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113 , 485 P.2d 1044 (1971); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., Utah, 521 P.2d 379 (1974).
. That family relationship is one factor which may be considered in determining whether privity exists, see 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, Section 532 and cases cited therein.
. Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1 , 474 P.2d 329 (1970).