The opinion
MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
I dissent.
In my opinion the information presented and filed herein by-Wesley Castles, county attorney of Missoula County, was and is sufficient.
It appears to me that the majority opinion reverts to the common law to determine the sufficiency of the information filed herein by said county attorney and completely ignores the statutory law prescribed by the legislature and by which alone the court shall adjudge the sufficiency of an information and which is the only law applicable thereto. See R.C.M. 1947, sections 94-6412, 94-6403, 94-6404. Compare State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309 , 99 Pac. 954, 956 , wherein Chief Justice Brantly, speaking of the above statutes and for this court, said: “In jurisdictions where there are similar statutes, the general rule is that a charge following the words of the statute is sufficient. ’ ’ Compare, State v. Hayes, 38 Mont. 219 , 99 Pac. 434 ; State v. Nielson, 38 Mont. 451 , 100 Pac. 229 .
In State v. Lake, 99 Mont. 128 , 43 Pac. (2d) 627, 629 , this court in a unanimous opinion said: “Obviously, the information was drawn under the provisions of subdivision 2, section 11368, Rev. Codes 1921 [now R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2701]. The charge is that of larceny as agents, servants, and bailees, and is in the words of the statute. The information generally follows the statute, and we think it is good. An information which charges the offense of larceny as agent or bailee in the language of the statute is sufficient and is not vulnerable to a general demurrer. State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309 , 99 Pac. 954 ; People v. Riccardi, 50 Cal. App. 427 , 195 Pac. 448 ; Connelly v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 295 , 248 S.W. 340 . The information was sufficient, and the court was correct in overruling the demurrer. ’ ’ Emphasis supplied.
Another reason that I cannot agree with the majority opin *491 ion is that State v. Hale, 126 Mont. 326 , 249 Pac. (2d) 495 , decided by this court May 27, 1952, establishel the law of this case for the district court in its retrial thereof. Such law of the ease so established is binding not only on the lower court but on this court on this second appeal. Neither the district judge nor the members of this tribunal should be placed in error in following the law so established in Hale’s first appeal.
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.