recognizing that a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics”
- adopting theory of strict products liability and noting in course of discussion thereof that liability may be imposed on manufacturer only if operative defect “existed in the product ... at the time the product left the manufacturer’s possession and control”
- stating that statutory comparative negligence scheme has “no application to manufacturers’ products liability, for its application is specifically limited to negligence actions”
- holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product, plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendant’s “possession and control”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1370 IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion states that “the issue for us in this case is the present and the future of products liability litigation in Oklahoma”, and discusses in detail the practical applications raised by the adoption of strict liability in the areas of limitation, defenses, parties, proofs, etc.
In my opinion, decisional law concerning manufacturers’ products liability would be better developed by resolving issues presented in each particular case and we should not determine in this case issues neither presented nor necessary to decide. My opinion is in harmony with Edwards v. Hanna Lumber Company, Okl., 415 P.2d 980 ; Eberle v. State ex rel. Department of Highways, Okl., 385 P.2d 868 ; In Re Fletcher’s Estate, Okl., 308 P.2d 304 ; and cases of similar import which, in effect, support the proposition that this Court on appeal will not determine abstract questions of law.
I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed but I would affirm such judgment under our present de-cisional law.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice DAVISON concurs in the views herein expressed.