The opinion
*334 On Petition for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
We have given the petition for rehearing filed herein close consideration. The justification and value of additional comment is problematical. At any rate, counsel among other things says:
“That while the controlling statute quoted in the opinion denounces the driving or operation of a motor vehicle by one under the influence of intoxicating liquors ‘on any thoroughfare, etc.’, this honorable court has mistakenly read the word ‘at’ used in the information to he synonymous with the word ‘on’. * * *
“That therefore this honorable court should reconsider said opinion, not alone in the light of its effect upon the liberty of plantiff in error, but as a stranger into Oklahoma jurisprudence tending to further confuse a social order, now admittedly nearing a debacle because of long continued contradiction of fundamentals and verities. That if this opinion stands, then the word ‘on’ presumptively, thoughtfully used by the law-making power stands deprived by the judiciary of all definiteness as a messenger of thought, and the condition becomes more chaotic.”
The pertinent portion of the information has been quoted in the opinion. We would emphasize that where an appellant did in the trial court enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged, as in the within case, unless the court could reasonably conclude that the information was so fundamentally defective as to wholly fail to state facts constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the information should be sustained. And it is our thought that in testing whether or not it alleges every element of the offense charged, that every favorable presumption as to the sufficiency should be indulged that the language of the information will reasonably justify. And while there is much merit to some of the counsel’s argument which tends to demonstrate apparent carelessness of counsel for the state in the preparation of the information involved, still, it is not difficult for the open mind to conclude that a person of common understanding would know with what he was charged so that he could have been enabled to plead jeopardy in case of a second charge for the same offense. Counsel for the defendant having refused to argue his demurrer, it is apparent that not much interest was manifested in “educating” the prosecution in the matter of amendment and right there fighting the case out on the merits and perhaps ending the matter. Preferable was the determination of the point in this court 1 rather than the trial court, which if the outcome should be favorable to the defendant would entitle him to a new trial and delay, and nothing more. Except that a recent spot ten-year check of the number of cases throughout the state, where sent back for new trial, developed that only a very small percentage were ever retried. Short tenure of officials familiar with the case, departure of witnesses, loss of interest, and new business of new administrations were the usual excuses. And while the accused has his choice, delaying tactics are not looked upon by courts with favor. And with good reason.
We go no further than finding that “at” as used in the information in question is synonymous with “on”. We find no basis for the fears and lamentations for the social order by and on account of the ideas as expressed in the quotation from the petition, set out above.
The defendant had his day in court. There was no fundamental error. The petition for rehearing is denied.
Where an information is fatally defective the question may ho presented for the first time on appeal. Waters v. State, 87 Okla. Cr. 236 , 197 P. 2d 299 ; Brannon v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 234 P. 2d 934 ; Kizer v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 249 P. 2d 132 ; Ex parte Brown, 77 Okla. Cr. 96 , 139 P. 2d 196 .