holding that there was no evidence "from which the court could have inferred that [the] defendant possessed the truck jointly with [the driver]"
How later courts described this case
- holding that there was no evidence "from which the court could have inferred that [the] defendant possessed the truck jointly with [the driver]"
- holding that inferences that could be drawn from the evidence were insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt criminal intent
- holding that the defendant’s “mere acceptance . . . of a ride in the stolen vehicle . . . did not in any way aid” the thief
- holding "mere acceptance . . . of a ride in a stolen vehicle" by passenger fails to establish involvement in initial taking or requisite dominion and control
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMPSON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concluded that the evidence and the reasonable inferences deducible from that evidence do not establish Moehring’s guilt as a principal in the second degree. The trial court stated:
In the case of Mr. Moehring, I would agree mere presence is not enough, and neither is flight from the scene or leaving the scene, but in this particular instance, Mr. Moehring — testimony is, and credible testimony is — was present when he saw the vehicle being taken, and he left the scene. And he didn’t just leave, but he left in the very vehicle that was stolen from the scene, that he saw it was stolen. Only inference, credible, reasonable inference that the Court can take from that kind of testimony. And based on that, I am going to find you also guilty of grand larceny, Mr. Moehring, as charged in the indictment.
If Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96 , 18 S.E.2d 314 (1942) and Murray v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 282 , 170 S.E.2d 3 (1969) remain good law, then Moehring aided and abetted Faison in larceny of Keeling’s truck. In Foster , we held that any person present at a crime who “approves” or “countenances” it, by any means, is assumed to be an aider and abettor. Foster, supra at 99 , 18 S.E.2d at 315 . Moehring’s acceptance of a ride in a car which he knew was stolen constitutes approval. In Murray, supra, the defendant was convicted of robbery as a principal in the second degree merely because he stood “real close” while his friend robbed the victim. Moehring observed the theft and then rode off in the stolen vehicle. His conduct reveals more overt action than the defendant in Murray . Further, the fact finder may draw all reasonable inferences from the circumstances surrounding the crime, Skeeter v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722 , 232 S.E.2d 756 (1977), Murray, supra in this case, Moehring’s actions before and after the theft.
The Commonwealth’s evidence supports the inference that prior to the theft Moehring either planned it with Faison or agreed to *570 act as a “lookout.” On this basis, the court could find that Moehring aided and abetted.
CARRICO, C.J., joins in dissent.