The opinion
DAVISON, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I dissent to that part of the "majority opinion in this case affirming the judgment of the Court of Tax Review because I am thoroughly convinced that the meaning of the term “legal current expense” as used in Const. Art. X, § 9(d) as amended 1955 is so doubtful and open to question when considered in connection with other constitutional and statutory provisions that the Legislature was authorized to define it by enacting House Bill No. 964 Act of the Twenty fifth Oklahoma Legislature, 70 O.S. 1955 Supp. § 4-40. The applicable rule of law is quoted in the majority opinion as expressed in the case of Board of County Commissioners of Marshall County v. Shaw, 199 Okl. 66 , 182 P.2d 507 .
If the phrase “legal current expense” was intended to mean all general fund expenditures, it would have been much, simpler and definite to have used the latter phrase in the constitutional amendment. Therefore, the phrase used must have been intended to have a different meaning. In the School State Aid Law, 70 O.S.1955 § 18-1 et seq., we find the use of a very similar phrase. In section 18-4 par. lb,- provision is made for “all other legal items of expenditure from the General Fund exclusive of teachers’ salaries, transportation, and capital outlay.” When the word “legal” is given the meaning of contrary to illegal, its use in the constitutional amendment is merely surplusage because all expenditures which are made must be legal in that sense. “ ‘Courts should avoid a construction which would render any portion of the constitution meaningless.’ ” Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State ex rel. Vassar, 187 Okl. 164 , 101 P.2d 793, 796 ; Knapp v. State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office, 206 Okl. 363 , 243 P.2d 660 . At this point, then, we are confronted with the question- — • “What was the intended meaning of the word ‘legal’ as used in the constitutional amendment under consideration?” It could have meant those current expenses “required by law” as distinguished from those “required by the rules and regulations of the State Board of Education.” With such an interpretation of the word, an examination of the provisions of articles 4, 9, and 18 of Title 70 O.S.1951 and 1955 Supp. leads to the conclusion that “the meaning of [the] constitutional provisions is doubtful [and] open to question, when considered in connection with other provisions of the Constitution” and statutes and “the construction placed upon it by the Legislature is entitled to great weight”, Board of County Commissioners of Marshall County v. Shaw, supra [ 199 Okl. 66 , 182 P.2d 513 ], “particularly where amendment is construed by Legislature that framed it.” State ex rel. Kerr v. Grand River Dam Authority, 195 Okl. 8 , 154 P.2d 946, 947 .
Another meaning which could equally well be applied to the word “legal” is that of “as defined by law” which would amount *684 to a direct authorization by the constitutional amendment itself of the Legislature to enact a definition statute. In either of the two latter situations House Bill No. 964, acts of the Twenty fifth Oklahoma Legislature, 70 O.S.1955 Supp. § 4-40, was valid and constitutional. It is my opinion that said defining statute is valid and that, being so, the Court of Tax Review was in error in striking it down and sustaining the protest in so far as it affected the method of computing the need for an emergency levy under the provisions of Const. Art. X, § 9, subsec. (d) as amended on April S, 1955.
I therefore respectfully dissent to that part of the majority opinion affirming judgment of the Court of Tax Review. In all other respects I concur.
I am authorized to state that WELCH and HUNT, JJ., concur in this dissent.