in a death-penalty case, where the evidence presented only one reasonable hypothesisthe defendant's guiltand where the jury charge on the prosecution's duty to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was "full and fair," the trial court's failure to sua sponte charge on circumstantial evidence was not reversible error
How later courts described this case
- in a death-penalty case, where the evidence presented only one reasonable hypothesisthe defendant's guiltand where the jury charge on the prosecution's duty to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was "full and fair," the trial court's failure to sua sponte charge on circumstantial evidence was not reversible error
- setting aside death sentence in spite of counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's argument
- appellant contended that cumulative impact amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel
- failure to interpose a timely motion to suppress constitutes a waiver of the constitutional issue in question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
Insofar as the conviction of the defendant is affirmed, I concur in the judgment only. Insofar as the imposition of the death sentence is reversed, I concur in that judgment also, but for reasons which differ from those of the majority.
The defendant was 15 years old at the time the crime was committed. No evidence was offered by the state showing that this defendant had engaged in any criminal activity prior to this time. The evidence that this *341 defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime was circumstantial evidence. The co-defendant Eddie Maurice Hawes (see Hawes v. State, 239 Ga. 630 (1977)), did not receive the death penalty. I would find that the sentence to death in this case is excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. Code Ann. § 27-2537 (c) (3).
On Motion for Rehearing.