Opinion

Riley v. State

  • 237 Ga. 124
  • 226 S.E.2d 922
  • 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1170
Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Filed
Jun 23, 1976
Status
Published
Author
Gunter
On the bench
Ingram, Gunter, Hill
Cited by
121 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.6%

setting forth nine factors that trial courts must consider in deciding whether to exclude a juvenile’s confession because it was not made voluntarily

How later courts described this case

  • setting forth nine factors that trial courts must consider in deciding whether to exclude a juvenile’s confession because it was not made voluntarily
  • the factors are (1) the accused’s age; (2) the accused’s education; (3) the accused’s knowledge of the substance of the charge and his right to consult with a lawyer and remain silent; (4) whether the accused was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, ftiends, or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was questioned before or after formal charges were filed; (6) the interrogation methods; (7) the interrogation length; (8) whether the accused previously refused to give statements; and (9) whether the accused repudiated the statement later
  • adopting the nine-factor test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
  • question of knowing and intelligent waiver by juvenile depends on totality of circumstances

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Gunter, Justice,

dissenting.

The appellant was convicted at his second trial for murder after his first trial for the same offense had resulted in the declaration of a mistrial by the trial judge for failure of the jurors sitting on the case to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty. My position on double jeopardy following mistrials in hung-jury criminal cases, where the defendant does not consent to the mistrial, has been made quite clear. See my dissenting opinions in Cameron v. Caldwell, 232 Ga. 611 ( 208 SE2d 441 ) (1974); Wood v. State, 234 Ga. 758 ( 218 SE2d 47 ) (1975); and Orvis v. State, 237 Ga. 6 .

Also, under the circumstances shown in this case, I think the incriminating statement made by the appellant at a time when he was unrepresented by counsel should have been suppressed.

My assessment of and decision on the effective assistance of counsel issue as raised in this appeal is not in agreement with the conclusion reached by the court.

I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.