rejecting challenge under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution to former ORS 254.590 (1971), renumbered as ORS 260.565 (1981
How later courts described this case
- rejecting challenge under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution to former ORS 254.590 (1971), renumbered as ORS 260.565 (1981
- purpose of 1968 amendment was to change basis for signature requirements and to provide more time for signature certification
- court analyzed Article IV, section 1, under 1902 version of that section, assuming that 1968 amendment made no substantive change with respect to legislature’s authority in connection with initiative and referendum
- "The explanation of the 1968 amendment in the official Voters' Pamphlet indicates that there was no intention in the drafting of the amendment to change the role of the legislature in connection with the exercise by the people of the initiative and referendum."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’CONNELL, C.J.,
Specially Concurring.
I concur in the result but I would not reach it on the grounds stated in the majority opinion.
The majority interprets the contract between Campbell and Campf and Collins to require Campbell to compensate the persons circulating the referendum petitions. I find nothing in the written contract itself or in the circumstances attending its execution which forces the interpretation adopted by the majority. The contract is equally susceptible to the interpretation that Campbell was obligated only to pay the wages of the office staff and any other employees who could be paid without violating the statute (OES 254.590).
When a contract is susceptible to either of two interpretations, one of which renders the contract illegal and thus subjects the contracting party to criminal prosecution, and the other rendering the contract legal, the court should favor the latter construction.
I would hold, therefore, that Campf and Collins could not be held liable for Campbell’s conduct in compensating the persons who circulated the petitions. I would, however, hold as the Court of Appeals held that OES 254.590 was violated by the payment made by Campf and Collins of money to Campbell to obtain signatures.
The majority treats OES 254.590 as a statute of “doubtful construction” and proceeds then by dictum to make permissible the payment of money to secure signatures if the payment is made indirectly by employing others to see that the job is done. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that there was no *100 ambiguity whatsoever in the statute, finding that “[i]t clearly forbids paying a person to secure signatures on a petition — precisely what was alleged and proven in the present cases.” 10 Or App 255 , —, 498 P2d 836 (1972). I, too, find no ambiguity in the statute and so construing it the question of the constitutionality of the statute, then, becomes critical.
The dicta in the majority opinion makes it clear that if the statute were read as the Court of Appeals construed it, the ■ statute would be unconstitutional. I would not agree. I think that the legislature was within constitutional bounds in attempting-to provide a safeguard for the referendum and initiative process by inhibiting those with wealth from exercising an unfair advantage by paying for the collection of petition signatures. Concededlv, this proscription puts substantial restrictions upon the machinery, by which signatures on petitions are collected. But the legislature has decided that the benefits flowing, from rer striding the influence of wealth in the initiative and referendum process outweigh the harm which would result to the process without the proscription. I do not think that this court has a basis for declaring the •legislative judgment unsound.