stating that because a jury may consider the refusal to take a breath test as evidence of guilt the question “would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone” was not one that would lead to a valid challenge for cause
How later courts described this case
- stating that because a jury may consider the refusal to take a breath test as evidence of guilt the question “would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone” was not one that would lead to a valid challenge for cause
- finding that question that asked Aif the victim is a nun, could [the prospective juror] be fair and impartial?@ was not a commitment question, but question that asked Acould you consider probation in a case where the victim is a nun?@ was a commitment question
- finding question that asked “[I]f the victim is a nun, could [the prospective juror] be fair and impartial?” was non-commitment question, while question that asked “Could you consider probation in a case where the victim is a nun ? ” was commitment question
- determining that question was commitment question, despite use of word “presume,” because it asked whether prospective jurors would resolve issue of guilt in DWI case if they learned a particular fact, i.e., that the defendant refused a breath test
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*185 KEASLER, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. WOMACK, J. joined.
I agree with the Court’s decision to overrule Maddux v. State. 1 But I would take this opportunity to overrule Nunfio v. State 2 as well. In my mind, the question asked in Nunfio, whether the juror could be fair and impartial if the victim were a nun, is not a proper question. It does nothing more than seek to commit the venireperson, which is inappropriate. Further, thanks to Nunfio, we have a system in which a trial judge never knows which fact-specific questions are permissible and which are not. Apparently, some are “commitment” questions, while others are merely uncovering bias. The category in which a question falls depends on the exact words used. Both litigants and trial judges are left in utter confusion, never knowing whether the questions are proper or not. Then this Court uses its power to decide on a case-by-case basis which voir dire questions are permissible.
I think that this Court could make better use of its time and that a bright-line rule is necessary. I would overrule Nun-fio and Maddux and hold that no fact-specific questions of any kind may be asked during voir dire because they do nothing other than commit the venire.
. 862 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
. 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).