reasoning that the jailer is a constitutionally elected officer of the county under Section 99 of the Kentucky Constitution, and reports to the fiscal court, which oversees the jail’s operation and budget (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that the jailer is a constitutionally elected officer of the county under Section 99 of the Kentucky Constitution, and reports to the fiscal court, which oversees the jail’s operation and budget (citations omitted)
- holding that KRS 44.070 does not vest the Board of Claims with jurisdiction over claims against counties
- holding that a jailer sued in his official capacity is cloaked with the county’s sovereign immunity
- recognizing that official capacity claims against a jailer are actually claims against the county
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Yanero v. Davis, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 (2001)
59 S.W.3d 896 (Ky. 2001), and overruled by Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510
The opinion
LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
Dissenting.
It is well settled that a county is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth and is, as such, an arm of state govern *903 ment. It is clothed with the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth. 1
It is equally well settled that in the absence of waiver, the county is immune from tort liability because of its status as a political subdivision of the Commonwealth. 2 Thus, the majority has correctly concluded that counties are entitled to sovereign immunity and the only question is whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over county government. The Board of Claims statute, KRS 44.070(1), whereby immunity is waived under the provisions of the act is written broadly. The relevant language is “the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any of its officers, agents, or employees.” In my judgment this is more than adequate to vest the Board of Claims with jurisdiction to adjudicate negligence claims against counties. As shown in Cul-lman, Malone, and other cases, counties are treated as appendages of central state government. Thus, counties may be properly regarded as “the Commonwealth” and subject to Board of Claims jurisdiction. If this is not so, however, use of language such as “cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies” is ample. I conclude, therefore, that KRS 44.070(1) was intended to vest the Board of Claims with jurisdiction of counties where negligence is alleged.
My view in this regard is strengthened by the dreadful unfairness of the result in the majority opinion. After having held that counties are not subject to suit in circuit court, the majority has gone further and held that neither are counties subject to Board of Claims proceedings. Thus, one injured by the negligence of a county is totally and completely without a remedy or any avenue of recovery.
The holding in the majority opinion directly contradicts Withers v. University of Kentucky. 3 In that case, the Court analyzed sovereign immunity in connection with a claim asserted against the University of Kentucky and its medical center. This • Court held that the University of Kentucky was an immune entity as it was an arm of central state government. This Court reasoned, however, that claims against immune entities fall within the purview of the Board of Claims Act. We stated that “The Board of Claims Act and sovereign immunity are co-extensive. It follows that a plea of sovereign immunity is an admission of Board of Claims jurisdiction.” 4
The opinion of the majority evades logic and fundamental fairness. The Board of Claims was created precisely to prevent the harshness associated with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. One claiming benefits of the doctrine should not be heard to deny that the Board of Claims can hear the case and grant compensation as provided for in the Act.
STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.
. Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195, 203 (1997); Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1967).
. Franklin County, 957 S.W.2d at 203 .
. Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997).
. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).