The opinion
CLARK, J., Dissenting.
For the reasons perceptively given us by Chief Justice Gibson in his dissenting opinion in Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831 [ 123 P.2d 457 ], by Justice Traynor in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790 [ 136 P.2d 304 ] and his dissenting opinion in Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301 [ 196 P.2d 20 ], and by Justice Burke in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ] and his dissenting opinion in Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ], I dissent.
California’s trial de novo review of administrative action should be reexamined. (E.g., Travis, Scope of “Independent Judgment” Review (1975) 63 Cal.L.Rev. 27; Note, Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association: Determining the Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in California (1975) 26 Hastings L.J. 1465 ; Gardner & Greenberger, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Responsible Government (1975) 63 Geo.L.J. 7; Forkosch, Judicial De Novo Review of Administrative Quasi-Judicial Fact Determinations (1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 963 ; Molinari, California Administrative Process: A Synthesis Updated (1970) 10 Santa Clara Law. 274; 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 29.01 et seq.; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question *740 of Law (1956) 69 Harv.L.Rev. 239; McGovney, The California Chaos in Court Review of the Decisions of State Administrative Agencies (1942) 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 391.)