holding the State’s argument referring to the “deterrent effect” of the death penalty did not warrant ex mero motu intervention by the trial court
How later courts described this case
- holding the State’s argument referring to the “deterrent effect” of the death penalty did not warrant ex mero motu intervention by the trial court
- prosecutor’s argument referring to the “deterrent effect” of the death penalty did not warrant ex mero motu action by the court
- citations -7- STATE V. SWAIN Opinion of the Court and internal quotation marks omitted
- “[I]nvoluntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being without malice, proximately caused by (1) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally dangerous to human life, or (2
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426 (1995)
Hill is easily distinguishable from this case in which defendant contracted to kill Mr. Worley for money and later killed Ms. Worley and her young child when Ms. Worley failed to pay him.
Distinguished by State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364 (1995)
Hill is easily distinguishable from this case in which defendant robbed and killed an elderly cafeteria worker with the additional aggravating circumstance of witness eradication.
Distinguished by State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208 (1993)
Hill is easily distinguishable from this case in which the defendant and others “gang” raped and strangled an eleven-year-old child to death.
The opinion
Justice Mitchell
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s holding that there was no error in the guilt-innocence determination phase of the defendant’s trial. As I believe the death penalty entered by the trial court was proper in this case, I dissent from the action of the majority in vacating the sentence of death and imposing a life sentence.
*488 The jury in this case specifically found as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(8). The jury then found that this statutory aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances and that the defendant should be sentenced to death. As a result, Judge Thornburg was required to and did sentence the defendant to death.
I am not willing to say that the sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. G.S. 15A-2000(d)(2). Given the fact that there are almost no cases in the “pool” we use for proportionality review which involve the killing of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties, I agree with the majority that any meaningful comparison in this limited pool is “virtually impossible.” Given this state of affairs, I am entirely unwilling to set aside a verdict of twelve citizens recommending death.
The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties differs in kind and not merely in degree from other murders. When in the performance of his duties, a law enforcement officer is the representative of the public and a symbol of the rule of law. The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire public—the body politic—and is a direct attack upon the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we know it is to survive.
A jury having found after solemn consideration that the defendant killed a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances and called for the penalty of death, I do not believe that we should hold the penalty disproportionate. I vote to find no error in either the verdict or the sentence of death.
Justices MEYER and Martin join in this opinion.