holding that the sex offender registration statute does not violate due process or equal protection
How later courts described this case
- holding that the sex offender registration statute does not violate due process or equal protection
- holding that the registration statute's requirement to register as a sex offender did not constitute punishment and therefore did not violate ex post facto prohibitions when it was applied retroactively to Ward's conviction for first degree statutory rape
- concluding that "an exceptional sentence cannot be sustained without 'the opinion of a mental health professional that the defendant would likely not be amenable to treatment'"(quoting State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 455, 799 P.2d 244(1990)
- holding Washington's sex offender registration statute was nonpunitive and did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Andersen, C.J.
(concurring) — I am concerned lest the majority in "interpreting” the sex offender registration statute has rendered it, if not unworkable, then at least uncertain.
I agree with the majority opinion that the sex offender registration statute is constitutional. However, the majority opinion goes on (see discussion, majority opinion at 502-03) and, under the rubric of interpreting or construing the statute, imposes on public agencies the obligation to have "evidence of an offender’s future dangerousness, likelihood of reoffense, or threat to the community” (majority, at 503) in order to justify disclosure to the public. That is both unworkable and unnecessary. The statute is plain and unambiguous on its face and therefore should not be subject *518 to judicial interpretation. In re Williams, 111 Wn.2d 353, 361 , 759 P.2d 436 (1988); State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 584 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991).
The statute clearly and expressly allows public agencies to authorize release of relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public "when the release of the information is necessary for public protection.” RCW 4.24.550. I do not feel it is constitutionally necessary to add to the clear requirements of this statute, and to the extent such additions are not constitutionally mandated they constitute inappropriate "judicial legislation”.
Brachtenbach, J., concurs with Andersen, C.J.