finding that various assessments, including a fingerprinting fee, a victims compensation assessment, and a drug assessment imposed on a criminal defendant convicted of drug charges did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they are “reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system and are not simply an executive branch tax”
How later courts described this case
- finding that various assessments, including a fingerprinting fee, a victims compensation assessment, and a drug assessment imposed on a criminal defendant convicted of drug charges did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they are “reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system and are not simply an executive branch tax”
- finding that a fingerprinting fee, a victims compensation assessment, and a drug assessment imposed on a criminal defendant convicted of drug charges did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they are "reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system and are not simply an executive branch tax"
- holding that “as long as a criminal statutory assessment is reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice 11 system, its imposition will not render the courts ‘tax gatherers’ in violation of the separation of powers doctrine
- holding that a court cost need only be "reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system” in order to not be considered a tax
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge, specially
concurring.
I join in the Court’s well-reasoned opinion, but write separately to express concerns not specifically addressed.
I agree the assessments discussed here are not unconstitutional because they do not violate Okla. Const, art IV, § 1, demanding a separation of powers. However, I believe dicta by Judge Brett in Ex parte Coffelt, 93 Okl.Cr. 343 , 228 P.2d 199, 202-03 (1951) is well taken and should not be ignored. As we stated in Ballard v. State, 868 P.2d 738 (Okl. Cr.1994), we do not preclude the possibility that at some point, the imposition to the Judicial branch by the Legislature of additional responsibilities in the form of collecting assessments may become so burdensome it will interfere with the court’s ability to perform its central functions. This Court should be ever vigilant to guard against creeping encroachment upon the dividing line between the three branches of government, to ensure one branch does not do indirectly what it is precluded from doing directly.
I also agree with the Court’s determination the assessments do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Legislature has endeavored to give courts various sentencing options as alternatives to incarceration. See, e.g., 22 O.S. 1991 , §§ 982a (judicial review of sentencing or probation revocation), 991a (county community service), 991a-2 (night or weekend incarceration), 991a-4 (community service sentencing program). To hold as Appellee would have us hold could limit a court’s consideration of alternate methods to deal with nonviolent offenders. And needless to say, the concept of involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to methodologies used to deal with those sentenced pursuant to valid punishment provisions.
I also agree Brown v. State, 314 P.2d 362 (Okl.Cr.1957) and Gaines v. State, 568 P.2d 1290 (Okl.Cr.1977) have no application to the case at hand.