holding that the instruction was erroneous because it "did not require the jury to find all of the same elements of the substantive crime that were contained in the instructions on the other similar sale counts the jury had under consideration."
How later courts described this case
- holding that the instruction was erroneous because it "did not require the jury to find all of the same elements of the substantive crime that were contained in the instructions on the other similar sale counts the jury had under consideration."
- stating that “[a] conscious and intentional purpose to break the law is an essential element of the crime of conspiracy and consists of two distinct crimes: the conspiracy and the substantive crime, which is the object of the conspiracy”
- determining that the district court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s requested jury instruction when the resulting jury instructions did not fairly and adequately explain the law of the case
- stating that “when a district court exercises its discretion and refuses to give a requested instruction, no error results if no abuse of discretion is shown”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LANCASTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the jury instructions given by the district court adequately stated the law and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving them.
District courts are given considerable latitude in selecting language for jury instructions. State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn.1998). “When determining the adequacy of jury instructions, we have held that' ‘[a] refusal to give a requested jury instruction in a criminal case lies within the broad discretion of the trial court * * *.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn.1995)). When reviewing jury instructions to determine whether a district court abused its discretion, the instructions must be read as a whole. Id. If, when viewed in their entirety, the instructions correctly state the law in such a way that can be understood by the jury, then the district court did not abuse its discretion and there is no reversible error. Id. When making this determination, the court must assume that “the jurors were intelligent and practical people.” Id.
The majority states that to convict Kuh-nau of conspiracy to commit sale of controlled substance in the first degree, the jury had to find that he possessed a “conscious and intentional purpose to break the law.” The state was required to prove that Kuhnau had knowledge of the conspiracy agreement and intent to commit the underlying substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy, i.e., sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. That far, I am in agreement with the majority, but I disagree with the majority’s holding that the instructions given did not correctly reflect the law.
The majority concludes that the instructions did not correctly state the law because they did not include the intent element of the substantive crime, specifically the instructions omitted the language “whether Kuhnau knew or believed that the substance sold was methamphetamine under the facts presented.” The majority focuses its analysis of the jury instructions on what it characterizes as missing or omitted language. In doing so, it fails to account for all the language that was present in the instructions and, therefore, fails to analyze the instructions as a whole.
In addition to the language quoted by the majority, the jury instructions stated: “A person conspires with another person when he agrees with the other person to commit a crime.” The instructions further stated: “The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all of the evidence tending to show intentionally concerted action to accomplish the commission of a crime. ⅜ * ⅞ j-rp^g co.conSpirators’] actions must be the result of preconceived and mutual intention to commit a crime.” To convict Kuhnau of conspiracy, then, the instructions required the jury to find that he and *560 his co-conspirators had an “intention to commit” sale of a controlled substance in the first degree.
Because the instructions required that Kuhnau intend to commit first-degree sale of a controlled substance, and because the crime of first-degree sale prohibits the sale of real drugs, the instructions necessarily encompassed the notion that a conspiracy conviction could not stand unless Kuhnau intended to sell real drugs. Put another way, when two or more people intentionally conspire to commit sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, it follows that they intend to sell real drugs. Accordingly, the district court’s instruction that “their actions must be the result of preconceived and mutual intention” adequately describes the requisite mental state for conspiracy to commit sale of a controlled substance in the first degree.
The majority also focuses on the substance that actually changed hands between Kuhnau and Officer Sherbrooke. A conspiracy charge does not require that any substance change hands; the crime is complete when there is an agreement to commit a crime (to sell drugs in this case) and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement is taken by one of the conspirators. If a substance actually changes hands, that certainly could be useful information for the jury in deciding whether the elements of conspiracy are met, but it is not itself an element of conspiracy. Here, the state misplaced the substance that changed hands prior to trial. Without the substance, the jury could well have concluded that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was methamphetamine. In fact, that seems likely given the not-guilty verdicts on the actual distribution counts for which transfer of real drugs is an element. Whether the substance was methamphetamine, however, is not dispositive of the question of what Kuhnau conspired to distribute. The defense argued vigorously at trial that he did not intend to sell real drugs. The argument did not succeed, but nothing in the district court’s instructions prevented the argument from being presented.
Because the instructions as given correctly reflect the law, and because they did not preclude Kuhnau from arguing his theory of defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion by submitting these jury instructions. 1
. The majority characterizes portions of the state's closing argument as “misleading and confusing.” The state’s argument, to which no objection was made, does not render the instructions erroneous.