concluding that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant insurance company’s motion for a directed verdict and allowing the question of the subject vehicle’s ownership to be decided by the jury because, “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that there was a question of fact concerning ownership”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant insurance company’s motion for a directed verdict and allowing the question of the subject vehicle’s ownership to be decided by the jury because, “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that there was a question of fact concerning ownership”
- holding that the fact a husband handed money to a seller and took possession of the car and its title did not conclusively establish his ownership as he could have been acting as an agent for his wife, who retained actual possession of the unsigned title after purchase
- holding that a person entitled to PIP benefits under the no-fault act is not medically indigent under MCL 400.106(1)(b)(ii) because he is entitled to medical assistance “available through a legal obligation of a contractor, public or private . . . .”
- rejecting the argument “that acceptance of Medicaid payments for injuries suffered in accidents involving automobiles discharges an assigned claims servicing insurer from liability to the claimant or the providers of medical services for charges exceeding the statutory amount paid by Medicaid”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Michael J. Kelly, P.J.,
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I believe that the error of admitting exhibit 1, the receipt signed by the vehicle seller, Dennis Howder, was harmless and does not require reversal.
*146 The plaintiffs burden was not to establish who was the owner of the vehicle, but only that he was not. I believe plaintiff adequately established the circumstances of the transaction and that the receipt was not critical. The jury could have believed that Christopher Noel was his wife’s agent in picking up the car, that the car was purchased to replace Mrs. Noel’s disabled vehicle, that she supplied the money to buy it, and that the license plate from her old car was put onto the new one. This evidence did not depend on the receipt made out to Mary Noel, which was erroneously admitted. Furthermore, there was evidence concerning a contact with Dennis Howder by the Department of Social Services regarding the subject of the transaction, but no party offered any testimony of Dennis Howder. If consideration of the certificate of title alone is controlling, then under MCL 257.233; MSA 9.1933, Dennis Howder was the owner of record and title never legally passed to either of the Noels. Compare Michigan Mutual Ins Co v Reddig, 129 Mich App 631 ; 341 NW2d 847 (1983). Finally, representatives of defendant insurance company were in contact with Dennis Howder and yet failed to produce him in support of any claim it made to the effect that plaintiff Christopher Noel was the owner of the vehicle. I conclude either that Howder’s testimony would have been adverse to Citizens or that the failure to introduce his testimony or his deposition should be taken as an indication that his testimony would have been favorable to Christopher Noel.
I would affirm.