The opinion
LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s decision to affirm the judgment and sentence in this case, however, I must dissent to the Court’s determination that the record reflects insufficient evidence to support the restitution ordered by the trial court.
The testimony of the victim was never contested or contradicted at preliminary hearing or trial regarding the value of the building and contents. The rule we must follow in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. See Drew v. State, 771 P.2d 224, 227 (Okl.Cr.1989); Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202 (Okl.Cr.1985). This Court has never stated that the testimony of a victim as to the value of his own property is not sufficient to support a determination of value. Especially when the defendant never contests the value. This Court has never set forth a clear rule as to what quantum and quality of proof would be required in a case like this, except that damages to the victim must be determinable with reasonable certainty. See Crouch v. State, 744 P.2d 971, 973-974 (Okl.Cr.1987). This general rule of proof has been established by the uncontradicted facts presented to the trial court. Therefore, this Court is without authority to interfere with the findings of the trial court. I must therefore dissent to the Court’s determination that the evidence does not support the finding of the trial court as to the assessment of restitution.