stating that in reviewing “the sufficiency of the content of the notice,” we will entertain an issue on appeal if the decision or issue can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee has not been misled or prejudiced by the notice
How later courts described this case
- stating that in reviewing “the sufficiency of the content of the notice,” we will entertain an issue on appeal if the decision or issue can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee has not been misled or prejudiced by the notice
- "In considering the sufficiency of the content of the notice we now hold that if the intent of the appellant to appeal from a judgment may be inferred from the text of the notice and if the appellee has not been misled by the defect the appeal will be entertained."
- observing not many cases will involve both theories presented sufficiently for consideration by a jury
- upholding verdict based on instruction requiring plaintiff to make such showing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I. Being unable to agree with the reasoning or result reached in Division I of the majority opinion I respectfully dissent.
In my humble opinion Rule 336 says what it means, and under prior decisions of this court means what it says. If the rule is wrong it should be corrected by orderly revision, not by a judicial declaration which can lead to needless confusion.
As “relaxed” by the majority, rule 336 is now made relatively meaningless. It leaves practicing lawyers little of substance by which to be guided in taking an appeal and may well place on this court the endless task of resolving many if not all “substantial compliance” controversies on a case by case basis. In effect, the majority now says any notice will suffice if the opposition is thereby told an appeal is being taken.
Pending a studied and understandable revision of rule 336, I submit we should adhere to our holding in Schrader v. Sioux City, 167 N.W.2d 669, 672-673 (Iowa), and citations.
I would dismiss the instant appeal for want of a jurisdictionally adequate notice.
II. Without abandoning that position I yield to the will of the majority, thereby acknowledging the instant case is before us for review, and concur in Divisions II through V and the result reached.
MOORE, C. J., and MASON and HARRIS, JJ., join in this dissent.