holding that the phrase “causes the death of another human being” in our felony murder statute, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (c), means proximate causation; stating that, in homicide cases, when a defendant inflicts an injury, the injury is the proximate cause of death when “(1) the injury itself constituted the sole proximate cause of the death; or that (2) the injury directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death; or that (3) the injury materially accelerated the death, although proximately occasioned by a preexisting cause”; and stating that “[p]roximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal... conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the phrase “causes the death of another human being” in our felony murder statute, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (c), means proximate causation; stating that, in homicide cases, when a defendant inflicts an injury, the injury is the proximate cause of death when “(1) the injury itself constituted the sole proximate cause of the death; or that (2) the injury directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death; or that (3) the injury materially accelerated the death, although proximately occasioned by a preexisting cause”; and stating that “[p]roximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal... conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause”
- holding that when considering whether to overturn a prior holding, the appellate court must consider factors such as “the age of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, the soundness of its reasoning”
- holding that “the phrase ‘he [or she] causes’ in OCGA § 16- 5-1(c) establishes proximate causation as the standard for liabil- ity in felony murder cases”
- explaining that “[p]roximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal.. . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The Georgia felony murder statute provides that “[a] person also commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). In State v. Crane, 247 Ga. 779 ( 279 SE2d 695 ) (1981), this Court unanimously held that a “death of one of the would-be felons at the hand of the intended victim of the underlying felony” does not invoke the felony murder rule because the phrase “he causes” in the statute must be strictly construed to mean one of the defendants directly caused the death. Crane, supra at 779 . The State concedes that Crane is factually on all fours and accurately states the law in Georgia, but it urges this Court to overrule it.
The meaning of “causes” was open to two possible interpretations in Crane , and we chose the one that favored the accused rather than the State. Id. As we have already said twice in the nearly 30 years since Crane , “ ‘ [i]f this result be viewed as a defect in our felony murder statute, the remedy lies with the legislature.’ ” Hyman v. State, 272 Ga. 492, 493 ( 531 SE2d 708 ) (2000) (quoting Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277, 280 ( 295 SE2d 518 ) (1982)).
*664 “[E]ven those who regard ‘stare decisis’ with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where[, as here,] the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute.” [Cit.] A reinterpretation of a statute after the General Assembly’s implicit acceptance of the original interpretation would constitute a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.
Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 30 ( 694 SE2d 83 ) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially), quoting Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 90 ( 495 SE2d 13 ) (1998). Without strong reason to set aside a long-standing interpretation, we will not do so in the face of legislative acquiescence. “If this Court has been wrong from the beginning, on this subject, let the legislative power be invoked to prescribe a new rule for the future; until altered by that power, we are disposed to adhere to the rule which has been so long applied by our Courts and is so well known to the legal profession.” Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 358 (5) ( 519 SE2d 210 ) (1999). Thus, unless and until the General Assembly declares that the element of causation in the felony murder statute actually means proximate causation, we should adhere to our interpretation of the statute as set forth in Crane .
“[N]o judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. (Cit.) . . . The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence. In most instances, it is of more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions, as the personnel of the court may change, even though grave doubt may arise as to the correctness of the interpretation originally given to it. (Cits.)” [Cit.]
Etkind, supra at 356-357 (5).
Certainly, stare decisis should not be applied to the extent that an error in the law is perpetuated. [Cit.] However, [Crane] is not an erroneous statement of the law of Georgia, but merely a pronouncement by a majority of this Court as to the proper construction of the [criminal] law of this state on a matter of first impression.
Etkind, supra at 357 (5). “ ‘Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, *665 and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” Smith v. Baptiste, supra at 31 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially).
Decided June 28, 2010
Reconsideration denied July 26, 2010.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Dana J. Norman, Jesse D. Evans, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Tony L. Axam, Calvin A. Edwards, Jr., for appellees.
The identical fact pattern that was considered in Crane is now again before the Court, and the statute has remained unaltered by the General Assembly despite the passage of 29 years. All that has changed is the composition of the Court. We cannot and should not take it upon ourselves to expand upon the statutory language to achieve a result not expressed and not intended by the legislature. To do so is to eliminate predictability, stability, and continuity that is essential to a well-ordered judicial system. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this dissent.