concluding that error was preserved even though the city failed to provide the trial court “with the same legal authorities in support of its position that it. has brought to the attention of this court on, appeal”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that error was preserved even though the city failed to provide the trial court “with the same legal authorities in support of its position that it. has brought to the attention of this court on, appeal”
- stating the nature of the error must be timely brought to the 7 “PowerPoint is a Microsoft computerized graphics presentation program.” Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309 , 315 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003). 14 attention of the district court
- noting the two standards for review of jury instructions: “We review a claim that the court gave an instruction that was not supported by the evidence for correction of errors of law. We review the related claim that the trial court should have given the defendant’s requested instructions for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal citation omitted.)
- finding no prejudice where the city could not demonstrate the district court’s error forced the city to leave an objectionable juror on the jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Brenda J. Alcala v. Marriott International, Inc. and Courtyard Management Corporation D/B/A Quad Cities Courtyard by Marriott, 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 68 (2016)
708 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Iowa 2006), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699
The opinion
CADY, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion by the majority that the district court’s systematic exclusion of property owners from the jury panel did not constitute reversible error. The majority reached this conclusion by applying the incorrect standard, requiring a showing of prejudice, resulting in a decision that seriously undermines the basic democratic ideals responsible for the strength of, and confidence in, our American jury system.
I acknowledge that courts normally apply the prejudice standard to decide if defects and errors in the jury-selection process will support a reversal of the judgment. This standard, applied by the majority in this case, requires that error in the selection of the jury must be accompanied by a showing of prejudice to the challenging litigant in order to justify a reversal of the judgment. It recognizes the right of each litigant to a fair and impartial jury, and, based upon this right, properly requires a showing that the litigant was deprived of a fair and impartial jury due to the error. In other words, if the jury members ultimately selected were fair and impartial despite the error, then the error in selecting the jury was harmless.
While the landscape of the law is dominated by the primary colors of general principles, subtle shades of exceptions must be observed to fully depict the overall brilliance of the composite of justice. In this case, this essential shading is found in one of the fundamental hues of our American jury system — an impartial jury from a cross-section of the community. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 , 67 S.Ct. 261, 265 , 91 L.Ed. 181,186-87 (1946). When this pillar is systematically removed by those charged with the responsibility to oversee the jury-selection process, the injury and prejudice to an individual litigant is replaced by a greater injury not only to the jury system itself, but “to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.” Id. at 195 , 67 S.Ct. at 265 , 91 L.Ed. at 187 . “The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection.” Id.
Such action by the court “ ‘destroy[s] the basic democracy and classlessness of jury personnel,’ ” fails to give a litigant “ ‘the type of jury to which the law entitles him,’” and deprives litigants “‘a right which the lawmakers have not seen fit to withhold.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Roemig, 52 F.Supp. 857, 862 (N.D.Iowa 1943)). The gist of the problem was sue- *346 cinctly stated by the United States Supreme Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946):
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury
Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 , 66 S.Ct. at 985-86 , 90 L.Ed. at 1184-85 (citations omitted).
Our legislature has established those groups of individuals who are eligible for jury service, and it has even specifically provided that any challenge to a potential juror’s status as a taxpayer must be made during voir dire based upon a specific finding of unfair prejudice. Iowa Code § 624 .11A. It is not the role of courts to depart from this legislative standard and systematically remove groups from the community that our legislature has seen fit to include. That is a clear abuse of judicial authority, inflicted on a critical component of our system of justice, and it requires that we look beyond the general rule to draw out an exception that “reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case.” Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195 , 67 S.Ct. at 265 , 91 L.Ed. at 186 (footnote omitted).
The rule that should be applied in Iowa to claims of error in the selection of a jury is that such error will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless either individual prejudice is shown or there has been intentional and systematic exclusion of a group of jurors. This is the rule followed by the United States Supreme Court, as well as many state courts. See id.; see, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 , 899 n. 20 (Alaska 1971) (no showing of individual prejudice required); People v. Bell, 49 Cal.3d 502 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 , 137 n. 4 (1989) (“A criminal defendant who asserts a systematic exclusion of a cognizable class of prospective jurors in a pretrial challenge to the jury venire or panel need not show that his trial jury was underrepresentative.”); Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367 , 609 P.2d 309, 311 (1980) (“[Ajbsent either a showing of systematic, class-based exclusion of prospective jurors or a showing of prejudice, an irregularity in the selection of jurors, without more, must be deemed harmless error.” (Emphasis added.)); State v. Strodes, 48 Ohio St.2d 113 , 357 N.E.2d 375, 377-78 (1976) (“Unless prejudice to the defendant or the systematic and intentional exclusion of a group is shown, we will not reverse a judgment because of minor and technical defects in jury-selection procedures.” (Emphasis added.)), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3135 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1978).
The majority rejects this approach essentially on two grounds. First, it finds the no-prejudice rule inapposite to this case because the error here occurred after the jury panel was returned. This, of course, is a distinction without a differ *347 ence. When a judge acts to remove a class of jurors from the jury panel, what possible difference would it make to the ideals we are trying to observe if the illegal action was done before, during, or after the drawing and returning of the jury? In each instance, the evil inflicted is the same, and it is equally abhorrent to our democratic ideals of a jury trial. In each instance, the prejudice is the same. In each instance, prejudice is inherent in the illegal act of preventing a party from selecting a jury from a panel composed of a representative class of people.
Second, the majority relies on two of our prior cases in which we previously indicated that prejudice will not be presumed. See Alber v. City of Dubuque, 251 Iowa 354, 363 , 101 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1960); Johnson v. City of Waterloo, 140 Iowa 670, 671 , 119 N.W. 70, 71 (1909). Yet, these cases only express a general rule, and there is no indication we have ever considered the question from the perspective expressed in Ballard and Thiel . Additionally, the court in Alber applied the prejudice standard only after finding that it was a custom in this State to exclude taxpayers in tort cases against a city; it was in the best interest of the taxpayer jurors to exclude them; and the decision to exclude jurors was within the discretion of the trial court. See Alber, 251 Iowa at 363 , 101 N.W.2d at 190 . Thus, these cases have no significance today because there is now a statute governing the matter, and the discussion of prejudice was not subject to the scrutiny of the institutional injury.
If we truly embrace our jury system in this State, we should be willing, indeed quick, to implement rules to protect and preserve those fundamental concepts responsible for its historical success. Instead, the prejudice standard adopted in this case literally means no litigant could get relief from the illegal acts of a judge who systematically excludes a class of people from the jury as long as the jurors ultimately selected to serve on the jury were found to be fair and impartial. Yet, our rules must not just strive to achieve fairness and impartiality in the individual jurors selected. Under the majority’s rule, a judge could systematically exclude all women from the jury as long as the men selected would be fair and impartial. This is a barbaric concept, which the prejudice standard was never intended to sanction. A litigant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury selected from a representative class as determined by our legislature, and the loss of this fundamental principle through the improper actions of a trial judge and the implementation of an overly strict appellate standard can only lead to the erosion of the jury system.
I would hold that the trial court error in this case requires a new trial without any showing of prejudice to the City.