establishing that the right of a capital defendant to be present at all stages of his trial is guaranteed by Article I, section 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina, but holding that the harmless error standard applicable to errors under the Constitution of the United States must, nevertheless, be applied to violations of the right
How later courts described this case
- establishing that the right of a capital defendant to be present at all stages of his trial is guaranteed by Article I, section 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina, but holding that the harmless error standard applicable to errors under the Constitution of the United States must, nevertheless, be applied to violations of the right
- "If consolidation hinders or deprives the accused of his ability to present his defense, the charges should not be consolidated." (citations omitted)
- applying harmless error review to alleged violations of defendant’s nonwaivable right to be present at all stages of his capital trial
- “before the jury ‘finds’ a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, it must make two preliminary determinations: (1) That the evidence supports the existence of the circum stance and (2) that the circumstance has mitigating value.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Frye
dissenting as to sentence.
I concur in the result reached as to the guilt phase of the trial but find it necessary to dissent as to the result reached regarding the sentencing phase. As to the sentencing phase, defendant contended that the two requirements of unanimity and proof of miti *81 gating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitutionally limited the jury’s consideration of mitigating circumstances in Issue Three, and thus tainted the jury’s response on Issue Four. The majority rejects defendant’s argument regarding unanimity on the authority of State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 108 , 372 S.E. 2d 49, 74-75 (1988). For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in McLaughlin , I continue to believe that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. —, 100 L.Ed. 2d 384 . (1988), is applicable to the North Carolina death sentencing procedure. I also note that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case relied on by the majority of this Court in McLaughlin. State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1 , 372 S.E. 2d 12 (1988), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 103 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1989).