Shattuck v. Grider

BRETT, Judge

(concurs in part, and dissents in part):

I concur in that part of this decision as it relates to the general interpretation of legislation; that a parole is granted as a matter of grace by the executive branch of Government; and that there is not necessarily a contractual agreement between an «inmate and the state, as it pertains to the giving of blood for time credits. However, I dissent to the ultimate conclusions reached in this decision; and I am not especially impressed by the majority holdings of other states, as they pertain to the revocation of blood credits when an inmate’s parole is revoked. I concede also that I have been unable to find any jurisdiction which has ruled contrary to the majority view herein; but nonetheless, I believe that the giving of blood — under statutory authority — can be likened unto the passage of time toward the fulfillment of a prison sentence. I would hold that the time credit granted for the giving of blood becomes a vested credit when the blood is actually removed from an inmate; and that those credits should not be revocable credits, even though the inmate’s parole is subsequently revoked. The provision allowing blood credits has made available a major source for the donation of blood for use by the general public. The time credits allowed served as an incentive to facilitate that source of supply; consequently, I believe as a matter of public policy, if for no other reason, that source should not be jeopardized.