stating that the defendant was an “other party” if “at the time of the accident,” the plaintiff was not performing work that was part of the defendant’s trade, business or occupation
How later courts described this case
- stating that the defendant was an “other party” if “at the time of the accident,” the plaintiff was not performing work that was part of the defendant’s trade, business or occupation
- holding that, where the relevant business was construction, “the stacking of sheetrock ... constituted the final act of delivery, not an act of construction”
- holding “persons who function solely as suppliers and delivers of goods” are not in the trade, business, or occupation of a construction company
- involving injury to an employee of a truck company delivering sheet-rock from a sheetrock supplier to a general contractor
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Larry Donaldson v. Daniel H. Barrett, Incorporated Richard Manuell Cole, and Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. Caleb Manly Lail, 977 F.2d 572 (1992)
Hipp v. Sadler Materials Corp., 180 S.E.2d 501 (1971), and Burroughs v. Walmont, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969), are distinguishable from this case for the reasons that the Supreme Court of Virginia identified in Conlin:
The opinion
Buchanan, J.,
dissenting.
1 agree with the trial court that this case is controlled by the Bosher case. Here Lindsey & Waldron contracted to construct houses in Carriage Hill Estates. The houses had to have inside walls, to be made of sheetrock. Lindsey & Waldron contracted with Cherrydale to supply the sheetrock. Burroughs was an employee of the trucking company employed by Cherrydale to deliver the sheetrock to rooms in the houses to be built by Lindsey & Waldron. Burroughs was therefore engaged in a work that was part of the trade, business or occupation of Lindsey & Waldron, and was therefore not “an other party” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.