in order to preserve for appellate review an objection to a trial court’s refusal to give a party’s written requested charge, “all that is needed after the charge is a perfunctory objection identifying the omitted requested charge”
How later courts described this case
- in order to preserve for appellate review an objection to a trial court’s refusal to give a party’s written requested charge, “all that is needed after the charge is a perfunctory objection identifying the omitted requested charge”
- creditor’s acceptance of a conditional payment extinguishes the disputed debt by operation of law, notwithstanding protests that remainder is due, even with no meeting of minds
- “Although punitive damages cannot be imposed without a finding of some form of culpable conduct ... Cook presented evidence showing that First Union pursued the foreclosure even though Cook had made it known that his security deed had been marked paid____”
- provision for “liquidated damages” was unenforceable where “there is no evidence the [liquidated damages] bore any reasonable relationship to the actual damages which might accrue”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Miller, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with the result reached by the majority, but write specially with regard to Division 2. In assessing any error in the failure of the trial court to give a written request to charge, our main concern is whether at some point the grounds for the objection have been given on the record. Of course if the grounds were given prior to the charge to the jury, and this court has those grounds of record, there is no requirement that they be restated, and this court can review the error after determining whether those same grounds are argued on appeal. It is well established that review of the charge enumerated is limited to the ground of objection stated at trial. 3 In summary, my view is that the proper method of making an objection to a requested charge that was not given is to state that objection and the charge, and then state the legal basis. As a practical matter, this gives the trial judge a final opportunity to evaluate whether the grounds given require the giving of the charge or whether an additional charge should be given prior to the jury beginning its delibera *242 tions. This will assist in maintaining the integrity of the verdict and eliminate the need for appeals on this issue.
Decided March 30, 2001 —
Reconsiderations denied April 13, 2001 —
Alston & Bird, Jay D. Bennett, Candace N Smith, Paul J. Kaplan, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Emmet J. Bondurant, Michael B. Terry, Frank M. Lowrey TV, for appellant.
King & Spalding, Griffin B. Bell, Benjamin F Easterlin TV, Michael C. Russ, John P. Brumbaugh, for appellees.
Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, Evans J. Plowden, Jr., Dawn G. Benson, Charles K. Wainright II, amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope, Presiding Judge Smith, Judge Ruffin and Judge Barnes join in this special concurrence.
Benson v. Tucker, 160 Ga. App. 217, 218 (1) ( 286 SE2d 485 ) (1981).