holding that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to an equal protection challenge to a cap on damages recovered from a city because “[a] tort victim’s interest in full recovery of damages calls . . . for a form of scrutiny somewhere between the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny”
How later courts described this case
- holding that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to an equal protection challenge to a cap on damages recovered from a city because “[a] tort victim’s interest in full recovery of damages calls . . . for a form of scrutiny somewhere between the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny”
- stating that Article II, Section 4 does not afford more protection to victims of governmental torts than do the provisions of Article II, Section 18
- finding that tort damages cap discriminated against only certain victims of a given tortfeasor depending upon the amount of damages suffered
- discussing level of scrutiny required under the New Mexico Constitution article II, section 18 and noting that federal cases do not control
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 125 N.M. 721 (1998)
110 N.M. 621 , 798 P.2d 571 , overruled on other grounds, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 36
Declined to follow by State Ex Rel. Colorado State Claims Board of the Division of Risk Management v. DeFoor, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 203 (1992)
We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be ‘largely toothless.
The opinion
WILSON, Justice, specially concurring.
I concur that it is appropriate to remand this case to develop additional facts. However, I am not convinced that this is the appropriate time to decide the issue of heightened scrutiny, and like Justice Montgomery, would prefer to leave those doubts for another day.
Further, while I concur that this case involves a single occurrence, in light of my recent dissent in Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457 , 797 P.2d 246 (1990), I take exception to the analysis used by the majority in reaching that conclusion.