concluding, but not in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome when the case "hinged on a determination of eredibility," there was no corroborating physical evidence, and the victim's version of events was bolstered principally by inadmissible expert testimony
How later courts described this case
- concluding, but not in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome when the case "hinged on a determination of eredibility," there was no corroborating physical evidence, and the victim's version of events was bolstered principally by inadmissible expert testimony
- stating that to provide foundation for novel scientific principles, the court should explore such questions as “the correctness of the scientific principles underlying the testimony” and “the accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in applying the principles to the subject matter”
- holding that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an expert's testimony regarding credibility of a victim, where the testimony at issue comprised almost two-thirds of the trial transcript, occupied several trial days, and exerted a "pervasive impact" on the trial
- holding that an expert’s testimony that he believed the victim was telling the truth was inadmissible bolstering
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in State v. Maestas
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), superseded by rule as recognized in State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46 , 299 P.3d 892
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 461 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (2002)
In State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546, we confirmed that Rimmasch is inapplicable where “there is no plausible claim that the type of expert testimony offered by the pros
The opinion
HALL, Chief Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
I agree that the trial court erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the State’s expert witness. However, I am not persuaded that the error was other than harmless.
The case was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, and the evidence of the 17-year-old victim, standing alone, is sufficient to meet the State’s burden of proof. I am thus of the view that in the absence of the evidentiary error, there would not have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant.
I would affirm the conviction and judgment.