holding ordinance which provided for the alteration, repair, or destruction of unfit houses was a valid exercise of the State's police powers because "the legislative authority may ... impose and enforce regulations governing buildings upon private owned property without violating the constitutional property rights of the owner.”
How later courts described this case
- holding ordinance which provided for the alteration, repair, or destruction of unfit houses was a valid exercise of the State's police powers because "the legislative authority may ... impose and enforce regulations governing buildings upon private owned property without violating the constitutional property rights of the owner.”
- stating legislative findings of fact are not binding on a court and are subject to judicial review, and a court may consider extrinsic evidence for this purpose, but a statute will not be held unconstitutional unless such legislative findings are clearly erroneous
- finding city’s ordinance that caused financial loss to property owners was a legitimate exercise of police power as distinguished from a taking of their property for public use
- stating "it is presumed from the mere passage of the act that there was a finding of such facts as were necessary to authorize the enactment"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Legge, Justice
(dissenting).
Accepting the principle that the exercise of the police power must vary with changing social conditions, and fully *564 aware that in recent years the steady trend has been toward more and more paternalism in government, I am nevertheless unable to escape the conviction that the ordinance here in question, even as trimmed by the foregoing opinion, goes beyond the proper sphere of governmental'power.
The ordinance applies to owner-occupied, as well as to rented, dwellings, and to old buildings as well as to those newly erected. The cost of alterations necessitated by the ordinance is a factor to be considered in determining whether it is reasonable. Adamec v. Post, 273 N. Y. 250 , 7 N. E. (2d) 120, 122, 109 A. L. R. 1110. As the court there said: “A small additional cost in erecting a new building in conformity -with a regulation calculated to ‘secure the general comfort and health of the public’ even in a matter, perhaps, not of vital importance, may be reasonably justified by the result to be attained, while the cost of alteration of an old building to conform to such a regulation may be too great to be reasonably required for a doubtful or slight public benefit.” To this we may add that while the owner of an old dwelling is not immune from the exercise of the police power merely because such dwelling is his home, consideration of the cost of conforming to the new standards required by the ordinance would appear especially appropriate in such a case.
So long as the use by the owner of his property is not detrimental to health, safety or morals, he has a freedom of choice as to living conditions, including personal hygiene. He is not required to live, or to compel his tenants to live, in accordance with so-called modern standards or those regarded as necessary by social planners. It may be conceded that in a municipality as large as Columbia, some of the facilities required by the ordinance, such as inside toilets, proper electrical wiring, etc., are essential to public health and safety. But it does not follow, nor can it be reasonably inferred from the evidence, that considerations of public health, safety or morals require all of the facilities set out in subdivisions (a) through (g) of Section 9 of the ordi *565 nance. An owner of limited means may reasonably conclude that he cannot afford all four of the plumbing connections required by subdivision (a). He may feel that screens are unnecessary on inside doors. It would be unreasonable to allow an administrative officer to condemn his house as unfit for habitation because several windowpanes are broken. What constitutes “reasonable comfort” in heating facilities is a matter for him to decide. Privacy within the home is a matter personal to the occupants.
The police power, however kaleidoscopic, has its limitations, and where its exercise requires that private rights yield to the public welfare, it should be limited to the necessities of the public safety, health, peace or morals, and should not be concerned with individual comforts and conveniences.
Oxner, J., concurs.