holding that claim preclusion does not bar a claim where that claim had not yet accrued at the time of the earlier litigation
How later courts described this case
- holding that claim preclusion does not bar a claim where that claim had not yet accrued at the time of the earlier litigation
- holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"
- stating that trial court has responsibility “to determine whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has offered substantial evidence of malice in fact to support a punitive damages instruction” (quotation omitted)
- holding § 616D.030 did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tortious discharge action for filing a workers’ compensation claim because the statutory scheme “applies only to the administration of the act”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*383 Maupin, J.,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately to note my disagreement with the majority’s affirmation of the instruction containing the language from NRS 616C.530. That provision sets priorities for workers’ compensation insurers in their efforts to return injured workers to work. The priorities articulated do not create a legal standard governing an employer’s re-assimilation of an injured worker to the work place. I can see no legislative intent to that effect. Thus, the instruction was couched in terms of a specific duty that did not apply to employers. However, because the statutory language did not add a great deal to the standard of recovery that respondent was required to satisfy below, the giving of the statutory instruction was harmless error.
I also wish to emphasize in this separate opinion my view that the enactment of NRS 616D.030 was in no way calculated to overturn our decision in Hansen v. Harrah’s, 100 Nev. 60 , 675 P.2d 394 (1984), and its progeny.