holding that in an involuntary manslaughter case, a decedent’s careless conduct must rise to the level of an “independent, intervening act alone causing the fatal injury” in order to exonerate the accused from criminal liability
How later courts described this case
- holding that in an involuntary manslaughter case, a decedent’s careless conduct must rise to the level of an “independent, intervening act alone causing the fatal injury” in order to exonerate the accused from criminal liability
- holding “that by attempting to inject inapplicable principles of civil negligence into a criminal trial, Instructions B and C would have created confusion and would have been misleading”
- finding that “attempting to inject inapplicable principles of civil negligence into a criminal trial . . . would have created confusion and would have been misleading”
- finding waiver where party objected to opponent’s use of “reconstructed opinion evidence to prove speed” and then offered what the Court found was her own “reconstructed opinion evidence to prove speed”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE WHITING,
dissenting.
I agree with the concurring opinion that the majority’s application of a rule of purely appellate procedure in this case results in a “manifest unfairness to the defendant in a criminal case.” However, I do not agree that the doctrine of stare decisis binds us to perpetuate this manifest unfairness.
I recognize that the doctrine of stare decisis is more than “a mere cliche” in Virginia. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265 , 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987). Whenever possible it ought to be applied because it gives stability and predictability to the laws by which people regulate their conduct. See Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 169 , 112 S.E. 757, 760 (1922).
It is especially important in deciding contractual and property disputes. Smith v. Coleman, 183 Va. 601, 609 , 32 S.E.2d 704 , 707 (1945); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Farmville & P.R.R., 96 Va. 661, 662 , 32 S.E. 468, 470 (1899). The justification for the application of the rule is noted in our quotation of the following language from a Texas case:
‘The doctrine grows out of the necessity for a uniform and settled rule of property, and definite basis for contracts and business transactions. If a decision is wrong, it is only when *18 it has been so long the rule of action as that time and its continued application, as the rule of right between parties, demand the sanction of its error; because when a decision has been recognized as the law of property, and conflicting demands have been adjusted, and contracts have been made with reference to and on the faith of it, greater injustice would be done to individuals, and more injury result to society by a reversal of such decision, though erroneous, than to follow and observe it.’
Burks v. Hinton, 77 Va. 1, 24 (1883) (citation omitted).
However, the doctrine of stare decisis is, after all, not “an imperative mandate, but a mere judicial custom, or convenient maxim, which the courts have evolved for their own guidance.” William M. Lile, Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 Va. L. Rev. 95, 101 (1916). And where the previous precedent was contrary to reason, this Court is not bound to perpetuate such an error even though it involves the construction of a taxing statute. Home Brewing Co. v. Richmond, 181 Va. 793, 799 , 27 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1943).
In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to overturn the appellate procedural rule of Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 401 , 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970), we should consider first the nature of the rights and interests involved. Obviously, no property or contractual rights are involved in this case.
In overruling a prior case involving construction of a statute dealing with the judicial terms of office, the Court continued the above quotation in Burks as follows:
‘But when a decision is not of this character [involving property or contractual rights], upon no sound principle do we feel at liberty to perpetuate an error into which either our predecessors or ourselves may have inadvertently fallen, merely upon the ground of such erroneous decision having been previously rendered. ... In such case the former decision or previous construction is received and weighed merely as an authority, tending to convince the judgment of the correctness of the particular conclusion, and not as a rule to be followed without inquiry into correctness.’ (Citation omitted).
Burks, 11 Va. at 24-25 (emphasis in original).
*19 The Commonwealth cannot claim reliance upon the Saunders rule prior to its introduction of the disputed evidence. In criminal prosecutions, it should introduce only admissible evidence; its contention was, and is, that the evidence was admissible. Its reliance claim can only be upon this appellate procedural rule that effectively forces the defendant to choose between an effective defense before a jury or one before this Court. Measured against the defendant’s right to a fair trial and to present evidence in her defense, the Commonwealth’s reliance claim pales into insignificance.
Next, we must consider the impact of our overruling this procedural rule upon the past or future conduct of the Commonwealth and defendants in criminal cases. Such a decision would have no effect on past criminal cases because it involves a prospective change in a procedural rule. It could only have a salutary effect on future cases by providing a level playing field at trial and on appeal.
Accordingly, I would overrule that part of Saunders and our other criminal cases that enforce this rule, reverse this case, and remand it for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.