separation of powers doctrine dictates that court possesses inherent power to protect itself in performance of its constitutional duties; it is not logical to conclude that constitution denies judges authority to determine basic needs of their courts
How later courts described this case
- separation of powers doctrine dictates that court possesses inherent power to protect itself in performance of its constitutional duties; it is not logical to conclude that constitution denies judges authority to determine basic needs of their courts
- the judiciary has inherent authority to protect itself in the performance of its constitutional duties
- required proof of "immediate [and] necessary" [to the] "efficient and basic functioning of the court"
- “Both history and uncontradicted authority make clear *339 that ‘ “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” ’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S. Ct. 3090,41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Stafford, C.J.
(concurring)—I agree with the majority *253 opinion in all but one matter. At page 251 the majority would impose on the judiciary “the highest burden of proof in civil cases when courts seek to exercise their inherent power in the context of court finance.” The majority then employs the “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” test. I disagree with the overly strict burden of proof employed by the majority. The normal “preponderance of the evidence” test is most appropriate, and I would so hold.
While the burden of proof is an important issue in the overall consideration of “inherent power” it does not change the result in this case. Thus, I concur with the one reservation.
Rosellini, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Stafford, C.J.