concluding that “culmination of a series of developments that occurred after the original custody decree” established “substantial change in circumstances” where father “secured new employment,” father owned a house with girlfriend, father and girlfriend could “provide for the child,” and girlfriend helped take care of child
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “culmination of a series of developments that occurred after the original custody decree” established “substantial change in circumstances” where father “secured new employment,” father owned a house with girlfriend, father and girlfriend could “provide for the child,” and girlfriend helped take care of child
- holding that a “series of developments” for a parent, including a change in employment, an imminent marriage, and a new home constituted a showing of a substantial change in circumstances that would likely be beneficial to the minor child
- reviewing the trial court’s modification of a child custody order and noting that “the effects of the substantial changes in circumstances on the minor child . . . [were] self-evident, given the nature and cumulative effect of those changes as characterized by the trial court in its findings of fact”
- recognizing that the substantial change in circumstance must be based upon changes occurring after the entry of the original custody decree that affects the welfare of the child
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*482 Justice ORR
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority acknowledges “the trial court’s findings of fact do not present a level of desired specificity.” Unfortunately, the majority then proceeds to draw its own factual determinations from the recitation of the evidence found in the trial court’s order. While I acknowledge that there is evidence in the record to support a determination that circumstances have changed over the course of the approximate eighteen months between the original custody determination and the modification hearing, the trial court’s findings do not show that the changes were substantial and that they affected the welfare of the child.
The majority acknowledges a series of eight “findings.” None of these findings, however, directly address the effect of the changes on the minor child; it is only assumed by the majority that the change in circumstances affected the child.
As the majority notes, where “the effects of the change on the welfare of the child are not self-evident” it necessitates “a showing of evidence directly linking the change to the welfare of the child. See generally Lee’s Family Law § 13.103 (discussing cases in which our appellate courts have required a showing of specific evidence linking the change in circumstances to the welfare of the child).”
Unfortunately, it is the majority that makes the requisite linkage between the substantial change in circumstances and the purported effect on the child, not the District Court Judge. Since whatever effects there may be — if any — are not “self-evident,” this case should be reversed and remanded for additional findings of fact.
Justice PARKER joins in this dissenting opinion.