holding that a single indignity may not amount to outrageous conduct sufficient to support IIED claim, whereas an ongoing pattern of the same would
How later courts described this case
- holding that a single indignity may not amount to outrageous conduct sufficient to support IIED claim, whereas an ongoing pattern of the same would
- allowing IIED claim to go to a jury on plaintiff's allegations of "months of persecution by her co-workers" where they "shadowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at her work in ways that made her job markedly more stressful, all in retaliation for her good-faith complaint of sexual harassment"
- discussing courts that appear to have distinguished between situations where a defendant has misused authority under a collective bargaining agreement to torment the plaintiff and situations where a defendant has inflict, ed the distress through conduct that is purely personal and does not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority
- finding that “conduct generally labeled sexual harassment is outrageous and intolerable and, when performed with the requisite intent, satisfies the elements of the tort ... ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
(concurring with reservation).
I concur in the majority opinion with the following reservation:
I would not reach the question whether Retherford can pursue a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy and also a claim for breach of her collective bargaining agreement’s just-cause provision. It is not necessary to resolve this issue because assuming such tort cause of action exists, it is preempted by UADA, as explained in the majority opinion.
The majority holds that Retherford could pursue both a tort action and a contract claim, except for the preemption. Not only would this be duplicative, at least in part, but it possibly may violate the collective bargaining agreement, which requires that all grievances arising out of or resulting from the dismissal of a regular employee must be arbitrated. I therefore prefer to reserve judgment on this issue.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.