concluding that even if the trial court had erred by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, “the error was harmless because the trial court gave correct instructions as to possible verdicts on murder in the first and second degrees and the jury found the defendant guilty of the greater crime of murder in the first degree upon a theory of premeditation and deliberation”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that even if the trial court had erred by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, “the error was harmless because the trial court gave correct instructions as to possible verdicts on murder in the first and second degrees and the jury found the defendant guilty of the greater crime of murder in the first degree upon a theory of premeditation and deliberation”
- concluding that “in the context of the instructions given” the trial court’s comment that the defendant had “confessed” to the crime was not an expression of opinion where the comments were immediately followed by the instruction, “ ‘Now, if you find that the defendant made that confession . .. .’ ”
- concluding that failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as alternative to second degree murder was harmless because jury convicted defendant “of the greater crime of murder in the first degree”
- holding that a violation of a statutory mandates is reviewable de novo without objection
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*499 Justice Webb
concurring.
I concur in the result. I continue to adhere, however, to the reasoning of my concurring opinion in State v. Lane, 77 N.C. App. 741, 746 , 336 S.E. 2d 410, 412 (1985). For that reason I do not believe involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first degree murder and it was not error not to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter.