holding that defendant is liable under aiding and abetting the- ory if he “act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of com- mitting, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant is liable under aiding and abetting the- ory if he “act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of com- mitting, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense”
- stating that accomplice liability extends to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts that the accessory knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages
- requiring aiding- and-abetting instruction to state that the aider and abettor must act with “the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense”
- “[T]he weight PENULIAR v. GONZALES 821 of authority and sound law require proof that an aider and abettor act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the per- petrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Hajek and Vo, 58 Cal. 4th 1144 (2014)
Beeman, however, is distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Henderson, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1001 (1985)
(3) Respondent contends that Beeman is distinguishable because there, unlike here, the defendant requested that the erroneous instruction be modified.
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J. † Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the court’s conclusion that the jury instructions given in this case were inadequate because they failed to inform the jury that appellant could be guilty of aiding and abetting a crime only if he acted with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission thereof.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the reversal of appellant’s conviction. The verdicts clearly demonstrated that the jury disbelieved the testimony of appellant which would have supported a finding that he did not have the requisite criminal intent. Further, the record amply supports the conclusion that appellant acted knowingly and intentionally in encouraging and facilitating the commission of the offenses. Accordingly, the trial court’s error in refusing to give the modified instruction sought by appellant was harmless and the conviction should be affirmed. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].)
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.