involving brutal double murders and stabbings; the 1(d) aggravator was found to apply to the murder that involved “horrible sexual abuse and the imposition of extreme suffering,” but not to the murder that did not involve sexual assault, where death occurred swiftly and suddenly
How later courts described this case
- involving brutal double murders and stabbings; the 1(d) aggravator was found to apply to the murder that involved “horrible sexual abuse and the imposition of extreme suffering,” but not to the murder that did not involve sexual assault, where death occurred swiftly and suddenly
- no denial of fair trial where trial court failed to disqualify prosecutor who interviewed defendant shortly after commission of crime and was called as a witness for the defense
- involving brutal double murders and stabbings; the 1(d
- analyzing Neb. Rev.Stat. § 29-2523(2)(g) (Reissue 1989)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I find that I must concur in part and in part dissent from the majority opinion. I am in complete accord with the majority in nearly all of its conclusions, including its declaration that the court’s review and analysis in death penalty cases must include all first degree murder convictions for offenses committed on or after April 20, 1973, including cases presently pending in this court on appeal. Having reached that conclusion, however, I believe that for reasons more particularly set out by me in my dissents in State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56 , 287 N.W.2d 18 (1979), State v. Rust, 208 Neb. 320 , 303 N.W.2d 490 (1981), and State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568 , 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981), the imposition of the death penalty in this case violates both the state and federal Constitutions as presently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2519 et seq. (Reissue 1979).
As I have previously indicated, my conclusion here is not based upon any notion that the crime involved herein was not heinous, as that term is normally understood, or that the appellant in this case should not receive the most severe sentence which the law may impose. Rather, it is because I believe the provisions of both the state and federal Constitutions, adopted by the people, and the provisions of §§ 29-2519 et seq., adopted by the people through their representatives, the Legislature, have ordered otherwise. In my view one cannot review all of the cases in which a life was intentionally and unlawfully taken and conclude that the imposition of the death penalty in this case is uniform and proportional to other cases. The legislative intent as expressed in § 29-2521.01 makes clear that the death *234 penalty is not to be imposed in an arbitrary fashion. See, also, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972). Absent the Legislature modifying or repealing §§ 25-2519 et seq., we are bound by their provisions. It is not for the courts to override the dictates of the people in that regard. It is for that reason that I would concur in all of the majority’s opinion except that portion which affirms the imposition of the death penalty. Instead, I would impose a sentence of life and would hope that, by imposing a sentence of life, the board of pardons would not commute that sentence, so that the appellant in this case, having taken a life as an animal, would be required to spend the rest of his days living as an animal, within a cage. In my view that would indeed be a far greater punishment for the crime committed than even the one imposed by the majority.