adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia
How later courts described this case
- adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia
- abolishing inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases for reasons stated by the United States Supreme Court in Powell
- abolishing the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases
- abolishing inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Gregory, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This case represents more than a mere inconsistency in a jury verdict. It clearly discloses a misunderstanding on the part of the jury regarding the law governing the central issue in the case. Because of that obvious misunderstanding I would allow a new trial.
A single defendant killed two persons on the same occasion. Nothing in the evidence supports a conclusion the mental state of the defendant changed during the short interval between the killings. Yet, as to the count of the indictment regarding the first victim the jury found the defendant, “. . . not guilty by reason of insanity. . . .” As to the count of the indictment regarding the second victim the jury found the defendant “. . . guilty but mentally ill. . . .” That is to say, the verdict pronounced the defendant insane yet sane at the same time.
I recognize a jury’s power to disregard the law and through leniency acquit a defendant who it, in reality, believes to be guilty. That is because we do not look behind the jury verdict in the usual criminal case to ascertain the reason for the verdict, and because the State may not appeal the unfavorable verdict. There is no way to test the validity of such a verdict. Thus the verdict stands and if it is based on the decision of the jury to be lenient then we permit that because it serves as another safety valve in the criminal justice system. But the verdict in this case requires no looking behind because expressly stated on its face are opposite findings of fact as to a single issue. I cannot attribute this anomaly to leniency. It is apparent that not leniency but a misunderstanding of the meaning the law gives to the terms “insane” and “mentally ill” caused the discrepancy. In this case where the only issue the jury had before it was the mental state of the defendant I would not allow a verdict infected with such obvious misunderstanding of the law to stand. Therefore, I would reverse.