determining that a six-month contractual limitation for claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act¸ MCL 37.2101 et seq., was reasonable and did not unfairly deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to pursue his claim
How later courts described this case
- determining that a six-month contractual limitation for claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act¸ MCL 37.2101 et seq., was reasonable and did not unfairly deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to pursue his claim
- affirming summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's age discrimination claim based on state law, holding that the contractual six-month limitation period was reasonable
- stating that “no inherent unreasonableness accompanies a six-month period of limitation”
- holding that terms of an employment application are part of an employment contract
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McDonald, P.J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff claims the 180-day period set forth in the employment application is an unreasonably short period for bringing a civil rights claim. I agree.
Our Supreme Court in Herweyer v Clark Hwy Services, Inc, 455 Mich 14, 24 ; 564 NW2d 857 (1997), held:
By enacting a statute of limitations, the Legislature determines the reasonable maximum period a plaintiff can take to file a claim. Neilsen v Barnett, 440 Mich 1, 8 ; 485 NW2d 666 (1992). Courts should defer to the statutory period unless the period in the parties’ contract is specific and reasonable.
The majority relies on Herweyer, supra, and the factors stated in Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 410 Mich 118, 127 ; 301 *246 NW2d 275 (1981), in determining whether the shortened period of limitation herein is reasonable.
However, the Herweyer Court unanimously agreed with Justice Levin’s concurrence in Camelot, supra at 141 , where he stated:
The rationale of the rule allowing parties to contractually shorten statutory periods of limitation is that the shortened period is a bargained-for term of the contract. Allowing such bargained-for terms may in some cases be a useful and proper means of allowing parties to structure their business dealings.
In the case of an adhesion contract, however, where the party ostensibly agreeing to the shortened period has no real alternative, this rationale is inapplicable.
The Herweyer Court went on to decide that employment contracts differ from the bond contracts that were the subject in Camelot and that an employer and . employee often do not deal at arm’s length when negotiating contract terms. An employee in the position of plaintiff has only two options: (1) sign the employment contract as drafted by the employer, or (2) lose the job. Where one party has less bargaining power than another, the contract agreed upon might be, but is not necessarily, one of adhesion and at least deserves close judicial scrutiny. Herweyer, supra at 21 ; Bobo v Thorn Apple Valley, Inc, 459 Mich 892 ; 587 NW2d 501 (1998).
Justice Kelly framed the issue in Herweyer, supra at 15 , as follows:
In this wrongful termination case, the single issue is what limitation period for filing suit is appropriate where the period written into the employment contract is unreasonably short.
*247 Despite disavowing any expression of opinion concerning the reasonableness of the six-month limitation period later in the opinion the Court’s disposition of the case suggests that the shortened limitation period would have been found unenforceable. The Court recognized that “neither the trial court nor this Court of Appeals upheld the six-month period of limitation in the contract.” Id. at 21 . In fact, neither the trial court nor this Court explicitly ruled regarding the reasonableness of the period. Both courts determined that it was unnecessary to rule regarding the reasonableness of the shortened term because, even if it were unenforceable, the saving clause effectively barred the plaintiff’s claim. Once the Supreme Court determined that the saving clause was ineffective, there was no longer a basis to avoid ruling on the reasonableness of the shortened term. However, rather than remanding for a ruling on the reasonableness of the shortened term by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating “the limitation period for each of plaintiff’s claims is the applicable statutory period” and remanded the case to the trial court for farther proceedings. Id. at 24 . By this statement, the Court indicated by implication that the shortened six-month period in the employment contract did not preclude the plaintiffs action, even though the trial court, this Court, and the Supreme Court itself had avoided directly ruling with respect to the issue.
Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe Herweyer is supportive of plaintiffs position. The shortened limitation period under the facts of this case was unreasonable. The plaintiff and defendant did not negotiate the contract’s terms on an equal footing. *248 The seventy-one-year-old plaintiff had no negotiating leverage and was merely given the choice of signing the agreement or losing the job.
I would reverse and remand for trial.