although statute providing for authority of trial court to grant continuances was not a “model of precision,” reviewing court was able to discern its intended meaning from its text and therefore declined to also read into statute additional “inherent” authority of trial court in that regard; citing ORS 174.010
How later courts described this case
- although statute providing for authority of trial court to grant continuances was not a “model of precision,” reviewing court was able to discern its intended meaning from its text and therefore declined to also read into statute additional “inherent” authority of trial court in that regard; citing ORS 174.010
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FADELEY, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the court. The statute means what it says. Its plain language should be enforced, not erased on some claim of convenience to courts.
*595 The statute places a duty on the district attorney to timely prosecute a case or dismiss that charge for the time being. The dissent instead would let a trial judge decide what is timely and what is not in disregard of the statute’s express words. The trial judge’s function is to rule on continuance issues under the statute, not to rule on some other basis that the words of the statute do not contemplate.
The words of the statute provide no support for the dissent’s contention that imposing delays in bringing a case to trial — delays neither authorized by any statute nor requested by any party to the case delayed — “ensures that the rights of all parties are considered,” 316 Or at 607.