adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a)(1965); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 285-87 (Wis. 1974) (recognizing the doctrine of foreseeable misuse
How later courts described this case
- adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a)(1965); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 285-87 (Wis. 1974) (recognizing the doctrine of foreseeable misuse
- observing that Restatement (Second) § 402A “is supplemented by several comments that can be helpful in construing the rule when applying it to an individual factual situation”
- “Strict liability does not make the manufacturer or seller an insurer nor does it impose absolute liability.”
- "From the plaintiff's point of view the most beneficial aspect of the rule [of strict products liability] is that it relieves [the plaintiff] of proving specific acts of negligence."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hallows, J.
(concurring). In Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co. (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 421 , 114 N. W. 2d 823 , the writer dissented and advocated the abolition of the requirement of privity of contract in implied warranty *464 cases. Since then nothing has happened to justify waiting until the present case to find a solution to this controversial problem of product liability. The California case relied upon was decided the same year as Strahlendorf and sec. 402A of the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, now relied upon, was cited in the Strahlendorf Case.
I think the majority opinion is unnecessarily misleading in attempting to state the position of the court. The issue is stated in terms of strict liability and is also stated that we adopt the rule of strict liability in tort as set forth in sec. 402A of the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d. I think not. The Restatement is in terms of liability, but if we are to keep the doctrine of comparative negligence, which is one of the bulwarks against strict liability in Wisconsin jurisprudence, our statement of the first step in the solution of product-liability cases must clearly be in terms of negligence and not liability. It is a plainly misleading statement to say we adopt the strict liability rule but we do not mean it.
What we mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of sec. 402A, Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, in Wisconsin is guilty of negligence as a matter of law and such negligence is subject to the ordinary rules of causation and the defense applicable to negligence. While the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, sec. 402A, imposes a strict or absolute liability regardless of the negligence of the seller, we do not. This same approach and reasoning of providing a solution by favoring our comparative-negligence doctrine by adopting negligence as a matter of law rather than strict liability was used in the dog-bite cases, Nelson v. Hansen (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 107 , 102 N. W. 2d 251 ; Wurtzler v. Miller (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 310 , 143 N. W. 2d 27 . I concur on the express ground that the liability rests on negligence.
*465 In Re Amendment op State Bar Rules.
February 9,1968.
Dues of judicial members.
Per Curiam. Original Proceeding for the amendment of State Bar Rule 2, sec. 5.
Pursuant to a petition of the State Bar of Wisconsin this court did, on January 8, 1968, hear a request to amend State Bar rule 2, sec. 5, so as to provide that membership dues of judicial members could be increased to a maximum of thirty dollars per year.
The rule now provides in substance that membership fees for active members shall not exceed thirty dollars per year and for inactive members, including full time judicial officers, shall not exceed ten dollars per year. The active members’ maximum membership fee has recently been raised from twenty dollars to thirty dollars per year.
In response to the petition and hearing the court, by order dated February 8, 1968, has amended rule 2, sec. 5 to provide that the annual dues of judicial members may be increased to fifteen dollars per year.
By virtue of rule 2, sec. 3, 1 judges of courts of record not engaged in the practice of law are inactive members. As inactive members judges are not entitled to practice law or hold office or vote in any election in the State Bar. Rule 3, sec. 1 provides that, “Only active members of the State Bar . . . shall be eligible to serve as officers.” Rule 4, sec. 3 provides, “No person shall be eligible to serve on the board of governors from any district unless he is an active member . ...” It does not appear, however, that inactive members are prevented from serving upon the designated standing committees. (See State Bar By-laws, art. IV, sec. 1.)
*466 It is our opinion that in promulgation of the Integrated Bar, and in the formulation and adoption of State Bar rules and State Bar By-laws, it was clearly intended that judges of courts of record should be denied a right to participate in the election of officers and members of the board of governors and, in turn, in the affairs and management of the State Bar. We deem this policy to insure the independence of the Integrated Bar to be wise and reaffirm it.
Because judicial members have restricted rights to participate in the affairs of the State Bar, we believe this distinction should be emphasized by a corresponding differential in the maximum membership fee. It is for these reasons that we have amended rule 2, sec. 5 to provide for a maximum judicial membership fee of fifteen dollars.
State Bar Rules, 273 Wis. xii .