holding, pursuant to court's inherent supervisory power over courts, that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons"
How later courts described this case
- holding, pursuant to court's inherent supervisory power over courts, that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons"
- explaining that a party must make a clear and definite objection at trial to preserve an evidentiary challenge for appeal
- considering the defendant's close proximity to the victim when he threatened the victim with a wrench and the remoteness of the location at which the threat was made as relevant factors in support of the defendant's aggravated assault conviction
- refusing to review issue raised initially in reply brief because appellant "would be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to present an unopposed analysis”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEWART, Justice,
concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion. I write only because I believe the majority ought not approve the jury instruction that it characterizes as an Allen charge. In my *862 view, the instruction given provides too much leverage to a majority of jurors to exert undue pressure on the minority. This has the potential effect of distorting the deliberative process whereby jurors, through the free exchange of their individual views, reach a consensus through discussion, reason, and argument. Jury instructions should promote the deliberative process by encouraging the discussion of evidence and instructions. That process should not be sacrificed in the interest of reaching a quick group decision.
I recognize that the instruction states that a juror is not to give up a “conscientious conclusion” after reaching such a conclusion. However, the instruction given at the beginning of deliberations weighs too heavily in favor of telling a juror to yield his or her conviction to the majority early on. In short, the instruction reinforces the opinion of the majority more than is appropriate, at least in the beginning of deliberations.
Perhaps it is justifiable to give a true Allen charge after a lengthy trial in which the jury, after full discussion of the evidence over a protracted period, is unable to agree. My fear is that this instruction may have the effect of causing jurors who are initially in a minority to yield their convictions before there is a full airing of the evidence and of each juror’s views.
I do not believe, however, that on the facts of this case, the instruction was prejudicial error.