holding that a premises owner has a duty to remedy a condition on the physical premises that creates “an unusual risk of criminal attack,” but no duty to protect from the general hazard of crime which is “inherent in the society in which we live”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a premises owner has a duty to remedy a condition on the physical premises that creates “an unusual risk of criminal attack,” but no duty to protect from the general hazard of crime which is “inherent in the society in which we live”
- explaining that a landlord owes a duty to protect invitees against criminal assaults “when the landlord created a dangerous condition that enhances -5- the likelihood of exposure to criminal assaults”
- holding that a tenant’s guests are invitees of the landlord because the landlord derives a pecuniary benefit from the consideration paid by the tenants in exchange for the right to invite guests
- explaining that “tenants are invitees of the landlord while in the common areas, because the landlord has received a pecuniary benefit for licensing their presence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Wahls, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s decision that the cooperative association’s duty is analogous to that of a landlord, and that the duty that defendants owed to plaintiff is that owed to an invitee. I also agree that Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495 ; 418 NW2d 381 (1988), did not change the general rule that landlords have a duty to protect tenants and their invitees from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties in *152 the common areas of the premises 1 and that landlords are not the insurers of invitees’ safety. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s position regarding the precise nature and extent of the duty owed.
The majority, relying on Johnston v Harris, 387 Mich 569, 573 ; 198 NW2d 409 (1972), states that a landlord’s duty of reasonable care exists only when the landlord has "created a dangerous condition that enhances the likelihood of exposure to criminal assaults.” That a landlord has "created a dangerous condition” does not require that a landlord engage in affirmative acts that increase danger; a dangerous condition may be created by a failure to act, such as by failing to install adequate locks or lighting. Johnston, supra. The majority concludes that the danger of falling victim to a criminal attack in a parking lot is not a dangerous condition created by a landlord, but rather is a dangerous condition inherent in society at large.
I disagree with this reasoning. The assertion that the danger faced by plaintiff was a "dangerous condition inherent to the society in which we live,” while factually accurate, is not the test for liability. Rather, the question is whether defendants negligently failed to take steps to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal activity (the condition "inherent to the society in which we live”). To focus on third-party criminality as the dangerous condition, rather than on the condition of the premises, is to excuse landlords, regardless of any negligence in the maintenance of their premises, from liability. _
*153 I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a criminal assault in a poorly lit, unfenced parking lot in the Detroit Metropolitan area (or, apparently, any other high-crime locale) may be equally anticipated by a landlord and an invitee. The implicit assumption in this conclusion is that all persons in a particular high-crime area, including visitors from points afar, are cognizant of the likelihood of criminal attack in the area. Given the disparate rates and shadowy nature of crime, I am not willing to make this assumption. Rather, I would simply reiterate that, as the party more familiar with the area in which the premises are located, a landlord has a duty of reasonable care to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal assaults. Building parking lots are no less a part of the common areas of the premises than are vestibules or hallways in a building, and a landlord’s duty extends to all common areas. I therefore would hold that the trial court’s ruling that, assuming that the criminal activity was foreseeable, defendants had no duty to take affirmative steps to increase security was erroneous and would reverse the grant of summary disposition. 2
See Samson v Saginaw Professional Building, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 407-408 ; 224 NW2d 843 (1975); Johnston v Harris, 387 Mich 569 ; 198 NW2d 409 (1972); Holland v Liedel, 197 Mich App 60, 62 ; 494 NW2d 772 (1992); Rodis v Herman Kiefer Hosp, 142 Mich App 425, 428-429 ; 370 NW2d 18 (1985); Aisner v Lafayette Towers, 129 Mich App 642, 645 ; 341 NW2d 852 (1983).
would also note that, on appeal, defendants have misrepresented the law. According to defendants, the Supreme Court’s order in Harkins v Northwest Activities Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896 ; 453 NW2d 677 (1990), "specifically extends the Williams [v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495 ; 418 NW2d 381 (1988)] analysis to the landlord-tenant setting.” Defendants quote the Supreme Court’s order as follows:
"In Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495 (1988), we held, for reasons of public policy, that a landlord/ occupier’s duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees does not extend to anticipating and providing protection against the criminal acts of third parties.” [Emphasis in defendants’ brief on appeal.]
In fact, the order refers to the duty of a "landowner,” not a "landlord.” The order does not "specifically extend the Williams analysis to the landlord-tenant setting.”