The opinion
*375 Judge Greene
dissenting.
The trial court entered the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
4. That on the evening of February 28th, 1988, the defendant, Georgia Jackson Torres, was at her residence, this being after the death of one Florentine Conteras Torres, and that several deputy sheriffs had arrived at said premises, Deputy Sheriff Joe Sykes being one of the early arrivals; that Deputy Sheriff Sykes made inquiry about what happened the night before and that subsequently Deputy Sheriff Joe Sykes transported the defendant, Georgin [sic] Ann Torres, along with the defendant’s close friend, Brenda Purser, to the Sheriff’s Department in the City of Washington.
5. That the defendant at that time was not under arrest.
6. That the defendant was placed in a conference room in the Sheriff’s Department and that two of the defendant’s daughters, along with Brenda Purser and Charles Purser, were at the Sheriff’s Department.
7. That before the interview of the defendant by S.B.I. Agent Lewis Young and Deputy Sheriff Donald Deese, the defendant was in the conference room of the Sheriff’s Depart- > ment in the company of Deputy Sheriff Sykes and was subsequently in the office of Sheriff Sheppard.
8. That her children were in and out and at the point where the defendant made inquiry about an attorney she was advised that she did not need one at that time.
9. That the defendant had not been placed under arrest during any such inquiry.
12. That while the defendant was in Sheriff Sheppard’s office she was advised that Officer Donald Deese and S.B.I. Agent Lewis Young would question her and she asked if somebody could be with her stating that she wanted Charles Purser and Brenda Purser to be with her and that was arranged; that thereafter S.B.I. Agent Lewis Young and Deputy Sheriff Donald Deese went to Sheriff Sheppard’s office to begin *376 the interview with the defendant, Georgia Jackson Torres, and that present with her throughout the complete interview that extended from 10:35 p.m., February 28, 1988 to 12:40 o’clock a.m. the next day were five individuals, to-wit: Young, Deese, Torres and Mr. and Mrs. Purser, with Charles Purser leaving only temporarily to obtain a soft drink for the defendant, Georgia Torres.
14. That the defendant prior to the commencement of the interview by S.B.I. Agent Young and Deputy Sheriff Deese was advised of her constitutional rights in conformity with the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ).
Conclusions of Law
1. None of the constitutional rights, either federal or state, of the defendant were violated by her detention, interrogation or statements.
4. That the defendant was in full understanding of her constitutional rights to remain silent and right to counsel and all other rights and that she freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived each of those rights and thereupon made a statement to Officers Young and Deese.
5. That the statement made by the defendant to Officers Young and Deese on February 28, 1988 and February 29, 1988 was made freely, voluntarily and understandingly.
“The determination of whether an individual is ‘in custody’ during an interrogation so as to invoke the requirements of Miranda requires an application of fixed rules of law and results in a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact.” State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 414-15 , 290 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1982). Determination of custody is based “upon an objective test of what a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe that he had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or, to the contrary, would believe that he was free to go at will.” Davis , at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 581 . Here, the trial court made no finding or conclusion concerning the issue of ‘custody.’ The findings of the trial court that the defendant was “not under arrest,” while relevant to the issue of whether a person *377 is in custody, are not determinative of that issue. See State v. Freeman, 307 N.C. 357, 362 , 298 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1983).
Nevertheless, the trial court’s failure to enter a conclusion on the issue of whether the defendant was in ‘custody’ at any relevant time does not preclude this court from making a conclusion on the issue “whe[n] the historical facts are uncontroverted and clearly reflected in the record. . . .” Davis, 305 N.C. at 415 , 290 S.E.2d at 583 .
Combining the uncontradicted facts in the record with the findings of fact entered by the trial court, it is revealed that the defendant, at the request of Deputy Sheriff Sykes, traveled from her home in a sheriff’s patrol car to a conference room at the sheriff’s department. She was picked up at her home at 6:30 p.m. and arrived at the sheriff’s department at approximately 7:00 p.m. She was placed in a conference room in the sheriff’s department and remained in the presence of Deputy Sykes until 10:30 p.m., at which time two S.B.I. agents arrived and entered the room and remained in the room until 12:40 a.m. the following morning. Deputy Sykes, without advising the defendant of her Miranda rights, questioned the defendant “about what happened the night before.” Sykes testified that if defendant had attempted to leave the conference room, he would have detained her. At some point between 7:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. the defendant made inquiry of either or both Deputy Sykes and Sheriff Nelson Sheppard as to whether she needed an attorney, and she was told that “she did not need one at that time.” S.B.I. Agents Lewis Young and Donald Deese advised defendant of her Miranda rights at approximately 10:30 p.m. Specifically, Agent Young testified:
Q. All right. Prior to the time of asking her any questions, was she advised of her Miranda warnings?
A. Yes sir, she was.
Q. What did you . . . what did you tell her and what was her response?
A. I advised her she had the right to remain silent and not make any statement; that anything you say can be used against you in Court; you have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and have him or anyone else with you during questioning. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any *378 questioning if you wish one. Next I asked her if she wanted a lawyer now and . . .
Q. What . . . what did she tell you?
A. Well, at first she acted like she didn’t know which . ... what she wanted to do and I indicated to her that that question meant did you want a lawyer right now in this very room while we talked; it doesn’t mean you can’t have a lawyer at another time or stop any time you want to, and she seemed hesitant as to what she wanted to do. She turned to the Pursers and they had some conversation about it and I told her all we needed was a “yes” or “no,” that we could not advise her what to do. She ultimately answered “no,” and then we went on and I advised her, if you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you have the right to stop answering them at any time. I asked her, “do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?” she answered, “yes, I do.” I asked her, “having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us and answer questions now.” She answered, “yes, I will.”
I believe these facts require the conclusion that the defendant was in custody and was subjected to interrogation not only when she was in the presence of the S.B.I. agents but also at the time she made her inquiry of Deputy Sykes as to whether she needed an attorney present at the time. 1 A deputy sheriff requested defendant to travel to the sheriff’s department in a patrol car. She was placed in a conference room at the sheriff’s department under the guard of a sheriff’s deputy for almost six hours and was questioned by both Sykes and the two S.B.I. agents regarding the events of the homicide. The defendant was at no time advised that she did not have to travel to the sheriff’s department with Deputy Sykes, nor was she ever told that she was free to leave the sheriff’s department. In my opinion, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that she had been taken into custody and would not have believed that she was free *379 to go at will. In fact, the events occurring made a belief that she was not free to leave the more reasonable belief.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that any custodial interrogation of defendant be preceded by advising the defendant that she has a right to the presence of an attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). Once a defendant invokes her right to have counsel present during the custodial interrogation, the defendant “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981). This is so even if defendant has been further advised of his Miranda rights and waived those rights. Id.
Here, the defendant did not specifically request a lawyer but instead inquired of a custodial law enforcement officer whether she needed a lawyer at the time. The officer responded in the negative. Because the State has the burden of establishing a valid waiver and all doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting constitutional claims, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 640 (1986), “a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation [must be given] to a defendant’s request for counsel.. . .” Id.; Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 , 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 928 (1987). In my opinion, when the custodial officer refused to seek clarification of whether the defendant specifically wanted a lawyer present prior to any questioning, the inquiry of the defendant regarding her need for a lawyer must be accepted as a request for a lawyer. See Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685, 700-01 (D.C. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 , 100 L.Ed.2d 927 (1988) (appropriate response to ambiguous assertion of right to counsel should be a request by police interrogators for clarification); People v. Superior Court of Mono County, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 , 50 L.Ed.2d 76 (1976) (when the accused asked interrogating officers “do you think we need an attorney,” officers were required to cease questioning); People v. Alexander, 261 N.W.2d 63, 64 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1978) (interrogation must stop when defendant asks interrogating officers whether they thought she needed an attorney); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505, 509 (1983) (“an ambiguous indication of an interest in having counsel requires cessation of police interrogation”); LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.9, at 532 (1984) (“an inquiry whether the police officer *380 could recommend an attorney” is an assertion of right to counsel by implication). Accordingly, all further police-“initiated custodial interrogation” should have ceased until such time as counsel was made available to the defendant or until such time as defendant initiated further conversation with the deputies or S.B.I. agents. Edwards , at 485, 68 L.Ed.2d at 387 .
Since the confession was the result of police initiated custodial interrogation which occurred after the defendant had invoked her right to counsel, the confession was not admissible, and in my opinion the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
. Assuming arguendo that the defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation until the S.B.I. agents arrived, the defendant’s assertion of a desire to speak with an attorney prior to their arrival was nonetheless a sufficient invocation of her right to counsel barring any police initiated interrogation. See LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.9, at 109 (Supp. 1990).