identifying information that, under certain circumstances, police categorically must provide to permit a determination that the defendant “knowingly and intelli- gently” waived Article I, section 12, right to counsel
How later courts described this case
- identifying information that, under certain circumstances, police categorically must provide to permit a determination that the defendant “knowingly and intelli- gently” waived Article I, section 12, right to counsel
- requiring evidence that the defendant was aware not only of the right to counsel generally but also of the benefit of counsel’s assistance in “forestalling] involuntary and incriminating disclosures”
- right enforced is not generalized right to counsel, but "more concretely, the derivative right to the benefit of counsel's efforts to forestall involuntary incriminating disclosures"
- “[T]he issue of a suspect’s access to counsel enters cases like the present as an aspect of [the suspect’s] right to answer questions or provide incriminating testimony only voluntarily. * * *. [I]t is not a generalized right to counsel that the decisions * * * enforce but, more concretely, the derivative right to the benefit of counsel’s efforts to forestall involuntary and incriminating disclosures.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DENECKE, C. J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the court’s decision. I specially concur because of the dictum in the court’s opinion to the effect that there is no law authorizing the police to delay or prevent communication between an arrested person and his or her lawyer. This dictum, stated in connection with the New York exclusionary rule, may create the inference that any evidence obtained as a result of an officer delaying or preventing communication is inadmissible. I would not concur in such a principle.
I also do not necessarily concur in the dictum stated in footnote 4.