defendant was convicted under a statute similar to section 76-5-202(l)(c), but which also includes language concerning killings in public places, when he assassinated his victim by opening fire in a crowded church
How later courts described this case
- defendant was convicted under a statute similar to section 76-5-202(l)(c), but which also includes language concerning killings in public places, when he assassinated his victim by opening fire in a crowded church
- victim was well-known and highly respected
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hall, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur specially in Division 1 because it appears to hold that Chenault waived his right to contest his sanity to stand trial through failure to move under Code § 27-1502 for a special jury at precisely the proper time. I feel that under the example of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375 , we should be reluctant in most circumstances to rule that one whose competence is in question competently waived the right to have the issue of his competence determined 1 ; and that we should be particularly reluctant so to rule where the alleged waiver resulted from a technical error in timing. Instead, and without reaching the question whether the trial court should have treated *227 the premature motion as revived when the proper time came, that is, after indictment, so that a special jury should then have been impaneled, I would prefer to rule that any error which might have been committed in connection with the court’s not impaneling a special jury to determine Chenault’s competence for trial was harmless, in light of the fact that at trial there was a full development of this issue, including the testimony of two defense psychiatrists, and there was simply no evidence whatever that Chenault was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Lloyd Baccus, a psychiatrist, testified for the defense that Chenault had been and remained a paranoid schizophrenic; but on cross examination he specifically stated that his examination had found Chenault competent to stand trial. Dr. D. C. Alfred, also a psychiatrist and the only other witness for the defense, testified to the same conclusions. There was simply no medical opinion evidence in this case suggesting that Chenault was incompetent to stand trial, nor had the defense been hampered in any way in obtaining or presenting such evidence had it been available. This, for me, completely distinguishes Pate v. Robinson, where the conviction was reversed because in that case four defense witnesses testified that Robinson was insane but the state was never required to respond in any substantial way. Thus, Robinson was convicted and sentenced though there had not at any time been a meaningful hearing on his mental condition. Chenault has suffered no such denial of rights.
Appendix.
Similar cases considered by the court: Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68 (179 SE2d 76); Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730 ( 182 SE2d 779 ); Watson v. State, 229 Ga. 787 ( 194 SE2d 407 ); Callahan v. State, 229 Ga. 737 ( 194 SE2d 431 ); Sirmans v. State, 229 Ga. 743 ( 194 SE2d 476 ); Scott v. State, 230 Ga. 413 ( 197 SE2d 338 ); Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700 (198 SE2d 865); Kramer v. State, 230 Ga. 855 ( 199 SE2d 805 ); Bennett v. State, 231 Ga. 458 ( 202 SE2d 99 ); *228 Howard v. State, 231 Ga. 186 ( 200 SE2d 755 ); Hunter v. State, 231 Ga. 494 ( 202 SE2d 441 ); Morgan v. State, 231 Ga. 280 (201 SE2d 468); House v. State, 232 Ga. 140 ( 205 SE2d 217 ); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117 ( 210 SE2d 659 ); Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280 ( 210 SE2d 810 ).
"The state insists that Robinson deliberately waived the defense of his competence to stand trial by failing to demand a sanity hearing as provided by Illinois law. But it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently *227 'waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial. See Taylor v. United States, 282 F2d 16, 23 (C. A. 8th Cir., 1960.) ” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 384 .