finding that, rather than awarding prejudgment interest for punitive damages, “trial court properly considered only the judgment for compensatory damages in determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest”
How later courts described this case
- finding that, rather than awarding prejudgment interest for punitive damages, “trial court properly considered only the judgment for compensatory damages in determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest”
- where evidence showed that vehicle manufacturer was aware of the problems inherent with placement of fuel tanks outside the frame on its full-size pickup trucks, which exposure could have been significantly reduced by application of a steel shield around the tank, or by using retaining straps with rounded edges, yet it did not implement such modifications because of economic considerations, such evidence of a knowing endangerment of all who may come in contact with one of the five million full-size pickup trucks still on the road, was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages
- reversing award of both compensatory and punitive damages when trial court admitted all evidence regarding punitive damages during the first phase of bifurcated products liability trial
- notwithstanding defendant’s compliance with federal regulation, award of punitive damages was appropriate because defendant did not implement safety modifications for economic reasons
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Webster v. Boyett, 269 Ga. 191 (1998)
213 Ga. App. 875, 889 (10) ( 447 SE2d 302 ) (1994), abrogated on other grounds by Webster v. Boyett, 269 Ga. 191, 196
The opinion
*890 Judge Harold R. Banke,
concurring specially.
On motion for reconsideration, I have been persuaded that the punitive damages award in this case was untenable as the product of an inflamed jury. Accordingly, I cannot concur with the portion of Division 8 of the opinion that even reluctantly approves of the amount of the punitive damages awarded.
This case demonstrates in dramatic fashion the inadequacy of the current method of determining punitive damages in Georgia. Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1, punitive damages are awarded solely to punish, penalize, or deter the defendant. The size of an award of punitive damages is generally left to the “enlightened conscience” of the jury, and the jury’s award will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the “judicial conscience.” Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 766 ( 386 SE2d 120 ) (1989).
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that punitive damages must be reasonable in amount and rationally serve the purpose for which they are awarded; in applying that standard, it approved a review process that compared the punitive damages award to the compensatory award. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 21 (111 SC 1032, 113 LE2d 1) (1991). However, our own Supreme Court has rejected the concept of proportionality where the punitive damages award is intended as a deterrence. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga. 613 ( 409 SE2d 501 ) (1991).
As a result, there is a great dearth of objectivity in the analysis or evaluation of punitive damages awards in Georgia. Our law provides much platitude and little guidance for determining an award of punitive damages. See Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga. at 616 . So long as the subjective exercise of a jury’s or a judge’s “conscience” remains the operative standard in assessing or reviewing an award of punitive damages, questions of excessiveness or inadequacy will continue to arise in cases involving punitive damages.
In the instant case, the trial was conducted in an ostensibly inflamed atmosphere, with counsel repeatedly introducing the inflammation by frequent reference to other incidents of post-collision fuel-fed fires, in violation of the order on the motion in limine by not first showing the requisite similarity. The motion for reconsideration suggests that this court is either irrational or subhuman. The merits of this case deserve more level-headed consideration than that advocated by Moseley’s counsel.
Inasmuch as the award for punitive damages in this case necessarily falls with the reversal of the judgment on the various evidentiary grounds, the opinion’s analysis of the propriety of the punitive damages is dictum, or perhaps even advisory. Nevertheless, to the extent that any discussion of this issue is appropriate in this appeal, upon *891 further reflection I conclude that the amount of punitive damages awarded should not be upheld in this case because it was the product of an inflamed, rather than enlightened, jury.
Decided June 13, 1994
Reconsiderations denied July 14, 1994.
King & Spalding, Griffin B. Bell, Frank C. Jones, Byron Attridge, Chilton D. Varner, Philip E. Holladay, Jr., for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Michael E. Hobbs, Deputy Attorney General, Butler, Wooten, Overby & Cheeley, James E. Butler, Jr., Robert D. Cheeley, Patrick A. Dawson, Albert M. Pearson III, Andersen, Davidson & Tate, Gerald Davidson, Jr., for appellees.
Alston & Bird, James C. Grant, Robert D. McCallum, Jr., G. Conley Ingram, amici curiae.