noting that, “[i]f the words of a statute are clear, [this court] should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the statute”
How later courts described this case
- noting that, “[i]f the words of a statute are clear, [this court] should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the statute”
- noting “community property of spouses may be subject to liability of judgments whether or not the wife was a party to the suit” (citation omitted)
- where statutory language is clear, a court should not alter the statute to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Thompson, J.,
dissenting:
I would set aside the summary judgment entered below and annul the result of the election. As stated in the majority opinion, 846 signatures of qualified electors and taxpayers were required before an election could be ordered. In finding a sufficient number of signatures, 882, the Board of Commissioners approved 71 signatures of persons whose names did not appear on the Lander County real or personal property assessment rolls. The 71 names so approved were of persons married to taxpayers who were listed. For each nonlisted spouse an affidavit of community property interest was filed.
1. The procedure for removal of a county seat to a new location is specified by statute. NRS 243.460-243.490. Qualified electors of the county who also are taxpayers as appears by the last real or personal property assessment roll, equal in number to at least 60 percent of the legal votes cast at the last preceding general election must sign the petition. If this does not occur, an election may not be held. Since 71 signatures of persons whose names did not appear on the assessment rolls were approved by the Board without which the petition was ineffective for want of requisite signatures, it is apparent that the statutory precondition was not met.
This court is not empowered to annul or alter the legislative direction that the names of the qualified electors and taxpayers must appear on the last real or personal property assessment roll. The legislative intent is clearly expressed and there is no occasion for construction. Blaisdell. v. Conklin, 62 Nev. 370, 373 , 151 P.2d 626 (1944).
The apparent purpose of the use of the assessment rolls to identify valid signatures is to make the Board’s determination simple and nondiscretionary. The Board was not granted authority to count other persons who otherwise might qualify as signatories. I read State v. Martin, 32 Nev. 197, 205 , 106 P. 318 (1910), to support this point of view. The legislature wished to avoid imposing upon the Board of Commissioners a fact-finding burden more properly reserved for courts to be resolved in an adversary atmosphere.
2. It is suggested by respondents that a refusal by the Board to count the 71 signatures of persons whose names did not *736 appear on the assessment rolls would somehow deny equal protection in violation of our federal constitution. I find this suggestion unpersuasive. In the first place, that issue is not validly presented in this case. The signatures were counted. If they had not been counted and an equal protection challenge tendered, the issue would have to be resolved. That did not occur here. Aside from this fact, persons who own community property may have it listed under both names on the assessment rolls if they desire their interests to be reflected in title documents. Consequently, if they are ineligible to sign the petition because their names do not appear on the assessment rolls, that ineligibility must be attributed to them rather than to the statutory wording selected by the legislature.
Respectfully, I dissent.